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When Hewlett-Packard (HP) announced in September 2006 that its
Board Chairman, Patricia Dunn, had authorized HP's security
department to investigate a suspected board-level press leak, and that
the investigation included tactics such as obtaining HP Board
members' and reporters' telephone records through false pretenses
(conduct known as "pretexting"), observers vehemently condemned
the operation as illegal and outrageous. In congressional testimony,
however, Dunn defended the investigation as "old fashioned detective
work. "Although Dunn would later claim that she was unaware of key
aspects of the investigation, her description was not so far off The
police routinely rely on deception to investigate and apprehend
wrongdoers. Although it is tempting to view HP's pretexting episode
as a one-time scandal, the episode illuminates a more important,
largely unexplored, conflict between corporate policing and corporate
governance.
This Article analyzes the tension between the board's competing
responsibilities of overseeing its internal corporate police and
implementing the norms and structures that presumably create ethical
(and therefore "good') corporate governance. As the HP scandal
aptly demonstrates, law enforcement techniques that rely primarily on
deception are likely to conflict with corporate governance norms such
as trust and transparency. After outlining the problem, the Article
considers its broader policy implications.
INTRODUCTION
When Hewlett-Packard (HP) announced in September 2006 that its
Board Chairwoman, Patricia Dunn, had authorized HP's security
department to investigate a suspected board-level press leak, and that the
investigation included tactics such as obtaining HP Board members'
telephone records through false pretenses (conduct known as
"pretexting"), observers vehemently condemned the operation as illegal
and outrageous.I
Testifying before Congress shortly after HP disclosed its pretexting
operation (which successfully identified George Keyworth as the leaking
board member), Dunn defended her actions and those of HP's
1. Peter J. Henning, Did Email Cause a Disconnect for HP Lawyers?, LAW.COM, Sept. 27,
2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 159261524292.
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compliance department as "old fashioned detective work.",2 Although
Dunn would later claim that she was unaware of key aspects of the
investigation, her description was not so far off. Public law enforcement
(what we commonly think of as "the police") has enjoyed a long history
of relying on differing levels of deception to investigate and apprehend
wrongdoing. 3 Although it is tempting to view HP as a singular instance
where investigators acted rashly, and executives, particularly the
Board's chair, failed to grasp what they were doing, the episode
provides a salient example of the ways in which corporate law
enforcement techniques clash with the very corporate governance norms
that the board has been charged with implementing.
Perhaps as an offshoot of the growing view of corporations as mini-
republics, 4 academics and lawmakers have come to embrace the idea
that corporations should have a "law enforcement" branch, which often
resides within the corporation's compliance program. 5 Compliance
programs generate internal codes and policies for the corporation;
educate employees on those internal codes and policies, as well as
federal and state law; and most importantly, detect and report
wrongdoing to the board of directors, and where appropriate, to outside
authorities.
6
Government officials often presume that corporate compliance
programs can more cheaply and effectively regulate corporate
employees than outside regulators. The in-house lawyers who supervise
compliance programs are often referred to as "[p]rivate attorneys
2. "I was told that phone records were one of the key techniques being used in the investigation,
along with 'relationship mapping' and what struck me as old-fashioned detective work. I did not find it
objectionable that suspected leakers might be followed to see if they were meeting with reporters."
Hewlett-Packard's Pretexting Scandal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations
of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 62 (2006) [hereinafter Hearing] (prepared
statement of Patricia C. Dunn, Former Chairman of the Board, Hewlett-Packard Co.), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 109_house-hearings&docid=f:31472.pdf
3. The FBI began using undercover investigations as early as 1910 and dramatically increased
its reliance on them as law enforcement tactic throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Katherine Goldwasser,
After Abscam: An Examination of Congressional Proposals to Limit Targeting Discretion in Federal
Undercover Investigations, 36 EMORY L.J. 75, 78 n.10 (1987) (describing growth of "undercover tactics
to conduct criminal investigations").
4. "Like the vassal whose power overshadows the king's, these companies act similarly to
traditional nation-states in some ways. They have tremendous economic power, establish security forces,
engage in diplomatic, adjudicatory and 'legislative' activities, and influence monetary policy." Allison
D. Garrett, The Corporation as Sovereign, 60 ME. L. REV. 129, 132 (2008). Compare with Usha
Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1389, 1390 (2006) (criticizing analogy between shareholder and citizen participation).
5. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 573, 615
(2005) (describing and categorizing growth of private police, including corporate security).
6. For a general overview of corporate compliance, see Corporate Compliance Committee,
ABA Section of Business Law, Corporate Compliance Survey, 60 BUS. LAW. 1759 (2005).
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general." 7 Companies that fail to employ "effective" compliance
programs risk future prosecution by the federal government for crimes
committed by their employees, 8 as well as more punitive sentences if
they are subsequently convicted.9 Therefore, prudent officers and board
members must ensure that a compliance program "exists" and that it is
"effective. ' 1° As a result, companies have, over the past several decades,
spent considerable time and money developing corporate security and
compliance programs; staffing them with ex-prosecutors, retired
policemen, and federal agents; and modifying them on the basis of
advice from various compliance "consultants.""II
Yet, those who rely on compliance programs to root out crime and
wrongdoing have given little thought to the extent to which corporate
law enforcement is likely to rely on deception, or to the corollary point
that the details of corporate policing may not match up so easily with the
bedrock norms of corporate governance: loyalty, trust,12  and
transparency. 1
3
7. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure,
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 342 (2007).
8. See Memorandum from Mark R. Filip, Deputy Attorney General, on Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations, to Heads of Department Components and United States
Attorneys (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelin
es.pdf [hereinafter Filip Memorandum]. Filip's Memorandum was preceded by the Memorandum from
Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Dep't Components & U.S.
Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty Memorandum], http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/20
06/mcnulty memo.pd. Prior to McNulty's memorandum, Larry D. Thompson, the predecessor Deputy
Attorney General had issued a similar memorandum requiring corporations to employ effective
compliance programs in exchange for prosecutorial leniency in criminally charging entities for
violations by corporate employees. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Dep't Components & U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter
Thompson Memorandum], http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporateguidelines.htm. See also U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2004) [hereinafter "Organizational Sentencing Guidelines"]
(instructing that courts should consider whether company employed effective compliance program).
9. See Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 8.
10. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996); Stone ex
rel. AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
11. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance,
81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003). See also Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of "Law Consultants," 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1397 (2006).
12. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001) (arguing that internal behavioral norms
may better restrain misconduct in firms than contractarian or external regulatory approaches); Renee M.
Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability in Corporate
Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105 (2006) (contending that personal accountability for directors is
necessary to counteract other psychological phenomena that permit directors to engage in socially
undesirable conduct).
13. Although disclosure is a presumed norm, not all shareholders welcome it. See Donald C.
Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat. Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals about
Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285 (2005).
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Society tolerates public law enforcement's use of deception because it
believes these techniques are both necessary and effective. 14 Deception
is instrumental in both identifying and incapacitating current criminals,
and in deterring potential perpetrators from engaging in any criminal act
at all. 15 Even if observers question the use of deceptive interrogation
tactics or undercover stings, law enforcement agencies have so fully
appropriated deceptive techniques in policing that deception has become
a behavioral norm throughout the law enforcement community.16
Deception has a less vaunted history in corporate law. Although the
Delaware Supreme Court has adopted the view that directors have an
obligation to monitor employees to ensure the existence of an effective
compliance program, it came to this conclusion relatively recently.
17
Perhaps the Court's uneasiness with imposing this duty on the Board
stemmed from the fact that monitoring and compliance often entail
surveillance and deception. 18 Deception is in direct tension with the
common norms associated with corporate governance: loyalty, trust, and
transparency. On one hand, the board must set an appropriate "tone at
the top" that creates a "compliant" corporate culture. At the same time,
the board has become a de facto police commissioner, with all of the
investigatory powers-and ethical quandaries-that accompany such
power.
14. "Undercover informants, those willing to pose as co-schemers, accomplices, or confidants of
criminal suspects, are the lifeblood of innumerable investigations and prosecutions. They offer police
and prosecutors the prospect of gaining admissible, incriminating, and extremely persuasive evidence:
damning statements that suspects make to those whom they mistakenly trust." Steven D. Clymer,
Undercover Operatives and Recorded Conversations: A Response to Professors Shuy and Lininger, 92
CORNELL L. REv. 847, 847-48 (2007). See also Bruce Pringle, Comment, Present and Suggested
Limitations on the Use of Secret Agents and Informers in Law Enforcement, 41 U. COLO. L. REv. 261
(1969) ("most authors ultimately conclude that informers and secret agents are a necessary component
of law enforcement"); Ileana N. Saros, The Undercover Operation: Indispensable Tool of Law
Enforcement, 9 CRIM. JUST. Q. 27, 27 (1985) (prosecutor arguing that undercover operations are
necessary to pierce the "veil of secrecy" surrounding various crimes).
15. See Bruce Hay, Sting Operations, Undercover Agents, and Entrapment, 70 MO. L. REV. 387
(2005).
16. "Virtually all interrogations-or at least virtually all successful interrogations-involve some
deception." Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1168, 1168 (2001) (prosecutor's observations and arguments in favor of using certain levels of
deception in interrogations).
17. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) ("absent cause for
suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to
ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists"). The Delaware Supreme Court
repudiated Graham in Stone v. ex rel. AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006)
(holding that "director oversight liability" applies when directors fail to assure "a reasonable information
and reporting system exists" within the company) (quoting In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698
A.2d 959, 971 (Del.Ch.1996)).
18. The 1963 Delaware Supreme Court described corporate compliance as a "system of
espionage .... " Graham, 188 A.2d at 130.
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This Article analyzes the tension between the board's competing
responsibilities of overseeing its internal policing apparatus and
implementing the norms and structures that presumably create an
atmosphere of "good corporate governance." As the HP incident aptly
demonstrates, law enforcement techniques that rely primarily on
deception are most likely to conflict with the norms frequently heralded
as the basis of good governance.
To date, this tension has not been explored by academics or
lawmakers. 19 Using the HP pretexting episode as a backdrop, this Article
explores the outlines of this problem and suggests broader policy
implications for further consideration.
I. THE ORIGINS OF HP's PRETEXTING PROBLEMS
HP's leak problems extended as far back as January 2005, when the
Wall Street Journal reported deliberations within HP's Board that
related to its unhappiness with HP's embattled CEO and Board
Chairwoman, Carelton (Carly) Fiorina, and the company's failure to
digest Compaq.2 ° Shortly after the Wall Street Journal article, at
Fiorina's urging, the Board's nominating and governance committee
directed HP's outside law firm, Wilson Sonsini, to interview suspected
board members. 21 This investigation, however, did not identify the
leaker.
22
Following an unsuccessful attempt to convince Fiorina to alter her
strategic vision, HP's Board dismissed Fiorina in February 2005. In the
wake of Fiorina's dismissal, Patricia Dunn became HP's non-executive
Chairman (a newly created position), and in March 2005, Mark Hurd
became HP's CEO.
Because Fiorina's initial investigation "had come to naught," Dunn
concluded that further investigation was necessary to identify the person
who had leaked information to the press. 23 Dunn then turned to HP's
19. Although a few authors have examined several issues raised by private policing, none have
addressed implications for corporate governance. See Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing,
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49 (2004) (citing dearth of analysis on topic of private policing); David
A. Sklansky, Private Police and Democracy, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 89 (2006) (raising concerns that
private policing undermines democracy); David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1165, 1167 (1999) (noting that scholars "have tended to ignore private security").
20. See Pui-Wing Tam, Hewlett-Packard Board Considers a Reorganization, WALL ST. J., Jan.
24, 2005, at Al.
21. See John Markoff, Fiorina Pursued Least at HP, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2006, at CI;
James B. Stewart, The Kona Files, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 19 & 26, 2007 at 152.
22. Hearing, supra note 2, at 45 (prepared statement of Patricia C. Dunn, Former Chairman of
the Board, Hewlett-Packard Co.).
23. Id.
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internal security personnel, who in turn relied on an outside private
investigator who had worked closely with HP for years. 24 Dunn stated
that she had intermittent contact with this investigator during the spring
and early summer of 2005. Dunn notified the rest of the Board of this
investigation (nicknamed Project Kona) in March 2005.25 Although
Dunn knew that Project Kona involved the accessing of telephone
records, she contended that HP's private investigator informed her that
such access was a "standard component" of HP investigations and that
the records were obtained legally.26 This first investigation directed by
Dunn-Project Kona I-terminated in August 2005 with no conclusive
results.
Several months later, in January 2006, the leak issue resurfaced. An
article that praised HP's new strategy appeared in CNET and discussed
confidential information available only to HP's Board.27 The CNET
article reignited the leak investigation, now famously known as Project
Kona II. Recognizing the potential legal problems that board-level leaks
could pose for HP, Dunn immediately initiated a new investigation of
the leak and expressed her urgency to HP's general counsel, Ann
Baskins. 28 The second, and far more intrusive, investigation extended
from January through March 2006. Among other things, the
investigation featured the following techniques:
" Reviewing the company email accounts, company phone
records, and computer hard drives of every member of HP's
"Executive Council";
* Hiring a private investigation firm, which subcontracted out the
job of obtaining private telephone records of select Board
members and nine journalists, including Dawn Kawamoto, the
CNET reporter who had written the January 2006 article;
* Surreptitiously following Kawamoto and suspected Board
members in public (and apparently searching through their
trash);
* Setting up a "sting" in which investigators sent Kawamoto an
email containing fake tips about HP and an attachment whose
24. Id. at 52-53 (describing contacts with Ron Delia).
25. Id. at 56.
26. Id. at 55-56. (describing her inquiry: "I asked Mr. Delia at every point of contact for his
representation that everything being done was proper, legal and fully in compliance with HP's normal
practices. I did this because it is the role of directors to ask questions and seek such representations from
the right people. Indeed, reliance on representations from trusted sources is a bedrock concept in board
governance for the express reason that directors cannot directly supervise management's actions.").
27. Dawn Kawamoto & Tom Krazit, HP Outlines Long-term Strategy, CNET NEWS, Jan. 23,
2006, http://news.com./HP+outlines+long+term+strategy/2100-1014_3-6029519.html.
28. Hearing, supra note 2, at 60 (prepared statement of Patricia C. Dunn, Former Chairman of
the Board, Hewlett-Packard Co.).
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tracking software would trace the email's path after it reached
Kawamoto' s computer.
29
The investigation was monitored and supervised by HP's chief
compliance officer and attorney, Kevin Hunsaker. Hunsaker reported to
Baskins, who, with Hunsaker, periodically advised Dunn of the progress
of the investigation. 30 Dunn would later contend that as a non-executive
chairwoman, she exercised no control over the investigation that she
initiated.3'
After investigators identified George Keyworth as the source of the
CNET leak, Dunn and Baskins sought outside counsel from Wilson
Sonsini, on how they should handle the matter and whether it should go
before the governance sub-committee or the entire Board. Prior to the
Board's May 18, 2006 meeting, the chair of the Board's Audit
Committee, Robert Ryan, asked Keyworth if he was the source of the
January 2006 CNET article; Keyworth admitted that he was.33 Ryan
then disclosed that Keyworth was the leak during the Board's
subsequent meeting. After Keyworth addressed the Board, it met
separately to consider whether to ask for Keyworth's resignation. 34
During the deliberations, another of the Board's members, the well-
known venture capitalist Thomas Perkins, stormed out of the meeting
and announced his resignation from the Board.35 Over the next six
weeks, Perkins and HP's outside counsel, Larry Sonsini, debated (a) the
manner by which HP had conducted the investigation, (b) the
investigator's attempts to obtain information regarding Perkins' personal
29. Report of Kevin T. Hunsaker, "Unauthorized Disclosure Investigation," May 24, 2006, at 3-
4, available at http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/0929061hp2.html.
30. Hearing, supra note 2, at 61.
31. Patricia Sellers, The Survival of Pattie Dunn, FORTUNE, June 11, 2007, at 110.
32. See Hearing, supra note 2, at 64-65 (prepared statement of Patricia C. Dunn, Former
Chairman of the Board, Hewlett-Packard Co.); Stewart, supra note 21, at 162-63 (During a meeting,
"Baskins and Sonsini said that it would be improper to keep the information from the full board," and
so, Dunn debated whether to send the information first to the governance or audit committees.).
33. During this conversation, Keyworth allegedly indicated that he would have readily admitted
this had anyone directly asked. Stewart, supra note 21, at 163 (reporting that Keyworth's response was,
"Why didn't you just ask me?").
34. Id.
35. Hearing, supra note 2, at 68-69 (prepared statement of Patricia C. Dunn, Former Chairman
of the Board, Hewlett-Packard Co.). Perkins and Dunn have provided different accounts of what sparked
Perkins's ire. According to Perkins, he objected both to the investigator's tactics and to Dunn's decision
to bring the matter before the entire Board and embarrass Keyworth. See Stewart, supra note 21 at 163.
Dunn, however, contends that Perkins never alluded to the investigation itself during the Board meeting,
and was referring solely to Perkins's request "to cover up the name of the leaker." Id. (quoting Dunn's
oral testimony before the Transcript of Hearing of Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, September 28, 2006, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/documents/HP-hearing9282006.htmnl).
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phone line, and (c) HP's obligation to disclose Perkins' reasons for
leaving HP.36
As a result of Perkins's protests, HP's pretexting investigation
became public in early September 2006.37 On September 12, 2006
Keyworth resigned; he admitted that he had been the CNET source, but
contended that he had HP's best interests in mind when he spoke to
CNET.38 Almost immediately after the investigation became public,
HP's tactics triggered inquiries by Congress, the SEC, and simultaneous
state and federal criminal investigations.
39
With the exception of Mark Hurd, none of the HP executives who
participated in the investigation fared particularly well, although their
criminal cases ended with more of a whimper than a bang.40 The
California Attorney General's (AG's) office initially indicted on felony
charges Dunn, Hunsaker, and the investigators who either approved or
engaged in pretexting. 41 Eventually, the AG's office reduced the felony
charges to misdemeanors, and a court ultimately dismissed Dunn's
charge. Hunsaker and two former investigators pled no-contest and the
court hearing their case agreed to dismiss their charges in exchange for
ninety-six hours of community service.42 A fifth investigator, who
personally handled the pretexting for HP and used Social Security
Numbers to obtain the actual phone records, pled guilty to federal felony
charges in Colorado.43 Apart from criminal liability, however, Dunn,
36. See Hewlett-Packard Targeted Board in Leak Probe Resigned Director Says Company
Fraudulently Obtained Phone Records, THE SMOKING GUN, Sept. 5, 2006, http://www.thesmokinggu
n.com/archive/0905061hpl.html (attaching Letter From Thomas J. Perkins to The Directors of the
Hewlett-Packard Co. (Sept. 5, 2006), Email from Larry Sonsini to Thomas J. Perkins (June 28, 2006)
and Letter from Travis M. Dodd, General Attorney, AT&T Services, Inc., to Thomas J. Perkins (Aug.
11, 2006) (detailing how Perkins's personal phone records were accessed by the creation of an online
account and the use of Perkins's Social Security Number)).
37. See Hewlett-Packard Co., Current Report (Form 8K) (Sept. 6, 2006).
38. See News Release, Hewlett-Packard Co., George Keyworth Resigns as HP Director (Sept.
12, 2006), http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/newsroom/press/2006/060912b.html. The source of the 2005 Wall
Street Journal article was never identified.
39. Jim Hopkins & Jon Swartz, Investigations Continue at HP: Scandal Gets Scrutiny From
Several Fronts, USA TODAY, Oct. 5, 2006, at 2B.
40. Hurd apologized profusely and characterized Kona II as a "rogue investigation." See
Hearing, supra note 2, at 728 (testimony of Mark Hurd, President, Chief Executive Officer, and
Chairman of the Board, Hewlett-Packard, Co.).
41. Peter Carey, HP Insiders Charged with Felonies, KNIGHT RIDDER TRIBUNE Bus. NEWS, Oct.
4, 2006, at 1.
42. Jessica Guynn, Final Charges Dropped in HP 'Pretexting' Case, S.F. CHRON., June 29,
2007, at D1. The court commented that in its opinion, the conduct "amounted to boardroom politics and
a betrayal of trust and honor rather than criminal activity." Id.
43. Jordan Robertson, Plea Deal Advances HP Case, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 13, 2007, at 3. The
investigator, Bryan Wagner, worked solely at the direction of companies that HP had contracted with for
the investigation. As a result, HP's employees had far less control over, and knowledge of, the
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Hunsaker, and Baskins lost their jobs and suffered reputational harm. In
later interviews, Perkins portrayed Dunn as inexperienced in technology,
overly preoccupied with compliance details, and motivated by personal
dislike of some of her fellow board members. a
One of the greater mysteries of the HP scandal was that its lawyers
apparently concluded not only that pretexting was legal, but also ethical
and desirable. Unfortunately, the internal HP documents that HP's
lawyers provided do not reflect deep consideration of how either
Baskins or Hunsaker reached such a conclusion. n5
According to the Wilson Sonsini memo recounting Hunsaker's legal
inquiry, Hunsaker initially based his legal opinion on "about an hour's
worth of online research .... ,,46 In an email to Ann Baskins after the
pretexting investigation was well under way, Hunsaker reported that he
had secured the reassurances of the Florida company to which HP had
subcontracted the investigation. In the same email, Hunsaker relied on
third-party communications between an HP security officer and a small
,,47law firm that had conducted "extensive research on this issue ....
Hunsaker, however, apparently did not communicate directly with this
law firm. Nor did Hunsaker or Baskins solicit the opinion of more well-
known firms, such as Wilson Sonsini. Hunsaker's facile examination of
these issues was particularly striking in contrast to the concerns that
were raised by two lower-level HP security employees.48
Had Hunsaker rigorously analyzed the issue, he still might have
concluded that pretexting, depending on how it was executed and for
which purpose, might fall outside the technical purview of either state or
federal criminal law.4 9 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the federal law on
pretexting, pertains solely to attempts to obtain false information from
techniques that Wagner used to obtain the telephone records.
44. Suzy Jagger, Tech Nerd on the Board of Hewlett-Packard who Fought with Chairman over
Company Culture, TIMES (London), Nov. 5, 2007, at 52 (discussing interview with Perkins and his
complaints that Dunn was more interested with corporate governance and "box-checking" than with the
company's underlying business and technology concerns).
45. See SFGate.com, http://www.sfgate.com/chronicle/pictures/2006/09/29/mndoc.pdf (last
visited Oct. 1, 2008) [hereinafter SFGate Documents] (Letter from K. Lee Blalack II & Cristina C.
Arguedas to Comm. on Energy and Commerce (Sept. 28, 2006)).
46. Id. (Draft Memorandum of Interview with Kevin Hunsaker from Bahram Seyedin-Noor and
Trevor Lain to HP Securities Litigation Team (Aug. 21, 2006), at 41).
47. See id. (E-mail from Kevin Hunsaker to Ann Baskins (May 1, 2006)). The law firm-
Bonner, Kiernan, Trebach and Crociata-happened to share office space with Ron Delia, the private
investigator that HP had hired to direct the pretexting investigation.
48. See Stewart, supra note 21, at 160 (discussing HP security officers Fred Adler and Vince
Nye reservations, who concluded in an email to Hunsaker that pretexting "is very unethical at the least
and probably illegal").
49. Damon Darlin & Matt Richtel, Fuzzy Laws Come into Play in the H.P. Pretexting Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006 (citing difficulties in proving culpability under either state or federal laws).
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"financial institutions," which the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
itself admitted did not include telephone companies.
50
Regardless of the technicalities, Hunsaker should have recognized
that the risk of criminal, civil, and professional liability (not to mention
the potential effect on HP's reputation) was rapidly shifting. By the end
of January 2006, several wireless carriers and at least one state attorney
general had filed well-publicized lawsuits against data brokers for
pretexting phone companies. 51 In February 2006, the Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC), a privacy advocacy group, had sent a letter
to state bar associations arguing that an attorney's use of pretexted
records violated several provisions of the ABA Model Rules.
52
Also in February 2006, the FTC had publicly warned that although
pretexting did not violate the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the agency
nevertheless intended to bring law enforcement action against telephone
pretexters for "deceptive and unfair practice[s] under Section 5 of the
FTC Act.",53 During that same month, the Federal Communications
Commission also signaled concern with pretexting by requiring
telephone carriers to increase protection of their customers' personal
information.
Finally, numerous states, including California, had enacted laws
aimed at protecting personal customer and employee information
maintained by corporations. Specifically, California prohibited
unauthorized access to customer records from utilities.54 This last point
was particularly important because HP was headquartered in California.
There is no indication, however, that Hunsaker considered civil or
criminal liability under California's laws.
Although its stock price fared well despite the scandal, the company
did not escape completely unscathed.55 HP agreed to pay approximately
$14 million in fines to the State of California and implement changes in
its corporate governance, which was ironic given the fact that the
50. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6821-6827 (2006).
5 1. Dave Gussow, Verizon Lawsuit Says Phony Callers Are Committing Fraud, ST. PETERSBERG
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2006 (reporting lawsuits by Verizon Wireless, Sprint Nextel and the Florida Attorney
General).
52. Letter from Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center West
Coast Office, to State Ethics Comm. (Feb. 21, 2006), http://epic.org/privacy/iei/attyltr22106.html.
53. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Facts for Consumers, Pretexting: Your Personal Information
Revealed (Feb. 2006), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/credit/crelO.shtm. One might have
concluded that the FTC's statement was aimed at brokers who obtained telephone records under pretext
and then sold that information to someone else at a profit.
54. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 538.5 (West 2008) (criminalizing fraud in obtaining customer
records from public utilities).
55. Stewart, supra note 21, at 167 (noting HP's financial strength throughout the pretexting
scandal).
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"criminal conduct" emanated from HP's compliance personnel. 56
Meanwhile, the CNET and other reporters who were the source of the
investigation sued HP and others individually for violating their privacy,
as did the telephone carriers whose information had been obtained
without proper authorization. On February 14, 2008, the New York
Times reported that HP had settled the civil litigation with the Times and
three Business Week magazine journalists for an undisclosed sum. 57
II. TRACKING THE MOVE FROM GOVERNANCE TO POLICING, AND FROM
COMPLIANCE TO DECEPTION
Following the announcement of its conduct, much of the criticism
leveled at HP focused on the deceptive nature of its investigation and the
fact that one board member had used the company's investigative
powers to investigate her colleagues surreptitiously.5 8 Criticizing the
entire operation, Congresswoman Diana Degette opined that the House
Energy Committee's hearing was not about pretexting per se, but rather:
[A]bout how the Hewlett-Packard way became synonymous with digging
through people's trash, setting up bogus e-mails which were approved at
the highest levels of the company, and stinging unsuspecting
reporters.... [and] how a computer company suddenly found itself in the
business of trailing and photographing board members across the globe,
or surveilling journalists using ex-FBI agents who sat in cars and watched
as if their subjects were busy making truck bombs. 59
During the same hearing, Patricia Dunn explained that although she
never intended HP's investigators to engage in illegal conduct, she saw
nothing inherently wrong with the investigators' conduct:
The fact is that I believe that these methods may, in fact, be quite
common not just at Hewlett-Packard, but at companies around the
country. Every company has a security department. Every company of
consequence has people who do detective-type work in order to ferret out
the sources of nefarious activities.
60
56. HP also settled charges with the SEC for failing to disclose the reasons for Perkins's
resignation from the Board in May 2006 without monetary penalty. Therese Poletti, Hewlett-Packard
Probe by SEC Is Settled, KNIGHT RIDDER TRIBUNE Bus.NEWS, May 24, 2007, at 1.
57. Matt Richtel, Hewlett-Packard Settles Spying Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/14/business/media/14hp.html?st-cse&sq=hewlett+packard&scp = l
(reporting HP's settlement with the New York Times and three Business Week journalists).
58. Professor Viet Dinh, a former DOJ official who advised Tom Perkins during the HP scandal,
opined: "[It was unconscionable for a chairman to spy on her own directors." Viet D. Dinh, Dunn and
Dusted, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2006 at A. 14.
59. Hearing, supra note 2, at 5 (opening statement of Rep. Diana Degette).
60. Hearing, supra note 2, at 96 (testimony of Patricia C. Dunn, Former Chairman of the Board,
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Dunn's point was that the deceptive nature of HP's investigation was
neither unusual nor surprising. Companies do rely on security
departments to police their employees and, like any police force, they do
use deceptive practices to accomplish these ends.
61
Although Dunn's defense was hardly a winner ("everybody does it"
does not go very far in public hearings), the underlying contention that
deceptive misconduct requires deceptive policing was at least facially
reasonable. After all, HP had experienced a problem with Board
member(s) leaking information to the press (although the CNET article
that triggered the second Kona investigation was largely positive). Board
level leaks are undesirable because they enable board members to avoid
accountability while secretly manipulating public attention.62 Earlier
attempts to identify the leaker through direct questioning had turned up
no information. If the leaker was unwilling to come forward, how else
was HP supposed to identify him if not through deception?
63
It may be tempting to ascribe the worst aspects of the HP
investigation to rogue investigators and poor judgment, as Mark Hurd
did.64 It is even more tempting to forget about the pretexting incident
altogether since most of the pretexting-episode's architects have left HP.
The scandal is instructive, however, in that it demonstrates the
unexplored conflict between corporate policing and corporate
Hewlett-Packard Co.). See also id. at 62 (prepared statement of Patricia C. Dunn, Former Chairman of
the Board, Hewlett-Packard Co.) (describing the investigatory methods as "old-fashioned detective
work").
61. See discussion infra at Part II.B.
62. [Boardroom] leaks are terrible and pernicious. They can undermine a company's
planning and its proposed courses of action before they're ever tested in the crucible of the
marketplace. They may prevent frank discussion if board members think their statements will
become public fodder. It's unquestionably wrong for corporate directors to use the media to
vent their disapproval of, or disagreement with, various corporate initiatives.
Harvey L. Pitt, Looking for Leaks in All the Wrong Places, FORBES.COM, Sept. 19, 2006,
http://www.forbes.com/leadership/2006/09/19/leadership-pitt-hp-lead-govem-cx hc 0919-pitt.html
(arguing that Dunn should have sought to minimize risk of future leaks by increasing board's
collegiality). See also Simon A. Rodell, Note, Plumbing in the Board Room: Plugging Boardroom Leaks
Through a Good Faith Duty of Confidentiality, 59 FLA. L. REV. 631, 646 (2007) (arguing for a director
"duty of confidentiality" in part because media leaks "manipulate boardroom actions").
63. Pitt suggests that Dunn could have asked all directors, "at a face-to-face meeting, to make
their telephone and e-mail records available to a third party investigator." Pitt, supra note 62. Had
several directors refused on principle to provide such information, however, the investigation would
have proceeded no further. Moreover, Pitt's direct-confrontation method would not prevent a director
from handing over incomplete information (i.e., telephone records for one phone line, without disclosing
the existence of another). For a discussion of other deceptive, but legal practices, that HP's investigators
could have employed, see Daniel Fisher, Get Hunt and Liddy on the Phone, FORBES.COM, Oct. 2, 2006,
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2006/1002/040.html.
64. Hurd described the operation as a "rogue investigation" that went against the company's
"values." Hearing, supra note 2, at 728 (testimony of Mark Hurd, President, Chief Executive Officer,
and Chairman of the Board, Hewlett-Packard Co.).
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governance, and the manner in which this conflict has fallen on the
shoulders of the corporate board. On one hand, society has erected a set
of regulations and policies that tell corporations to "police" themselves,
or otherwise suffer significant-and in some instances, life-ending-
penalties. On the other hand, we have simultaneously informed the
corporate world that corporate governance is best achieved by
incorporating norms such as loyalty, trust, and transparency.
The conflict between corporate policing and corporate governance is
rooted in a separate conflict between two competing theories of
corporate governance: a "classical" structural approach to corporate
governance that seeks to reduce agency costs through implementation of
structures, and a far more normative "cultural" theory of corporate
governance that relies on social norms to prevent wrongdoing.
Part II.A begins by setting out these paradigms of corporate
governance and suggests that each of the two paradigms influenced the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbox). Whereas some characteristics of
Sarbox fall comfortably in the classical governance category, others,
such as the whistleblowing protection laws and disclosure rules on
corporate codes, are aimed at encouraging social norms such as loyalty
and trust. Part II.A also explores how cultural governance proponents
failed to consider the daily reality of corporate policing, particularly the
methods by which corporations were likely to implement compliance
programs in light of the government's emphasis on reporting and
discipline as criteria for reduced liability.
65
Part II.B explores some of the rarely-mentioned limitations of
corporate policing. In order to perform its function properly, the
corporate compliance program must obtain reliable information from the
company's officers and employees. Overt policing methods, however,
encourage avoidance of detection by those who fear that they will lose
their job or be reported to authorities. Accordingly, to detect
wrongdoing, the corporate investigator must rely on a technique well-
developed by public law enforcement agents: deception. As corporate
compliance programs become more responsible for finding instances of
wrongdoing and sanctioning employees for such wrongdoing, we must
consider the extent to which corporate investigators will rely on the
types of "old fashioned detective work" that Patricia Dunn cited in her
65. The criminal liability of corporate entities has been well debated. See Jennifer Arlen &
Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72
N.Y.U L. REV. 687 (1997); Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD.
319 (1996) (questioning the imposition of corporate criminal liability); Andrew Weissmann with David
Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411 (2007) (arguing for duty based
liability).
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defense of HP's board leak investigation.
Finally, Part II.C discusses how deception-fueled corporate policing
may affect corporate culture and thereby undermine the very goals of
"good" corporate governance that Sarbox drafters and supporters were
so intent on bringing about. From this perspective, the HP pretexting
scandal is not merely a blip in corporate history, but rather a bellwether
of the tensions that may arise as corporate compliance programs
integrate well-known policing methods.
A. Alternate Theories of Corporate Governance
Although corporate governance has become a fairly popular topic of
both scholarly and media discussion throughout the last decade, it does
not always carry the same meaning. Although most commentators agree
that Enron, WorldCom, and similar scandals demonstrate "bad"
corporate governance, the academic world's proposed solutions to this
problem emanate from widely different perspectives. Additionally, even
though the debate is sometimes spun as an argument between more or
less regulation, a deeper look at the literature suggests a far wider gap in
approach. There are, in fact, two identifiable paradigms of corporate
governance, and those two paradigms have led scholars to prescribe
vastly different solutions to the problem of corporate malfeasance.
1. Classical Corporate Governance
Traditionally, scholars have used the term corporate governance to
refer to the manner by which power and responsibility is allocated
between the corporation's managers and shareholders. 66 Under the
classical approach, "good governance" refers to the legal structures
(fiduciary duties, voting rights, and disclosure requirements) that enable
shareholders to better protect their investment by reducing agency costs.
Shareholders, officers, and board members alike are all presumed to be
rational actors.
In the standard narrative of corporation law, dispersed and relatively
powerless shareholders rely on the company's board of directors to
monitor the company's officers.67 Although shareholders may register
their disapproval of how management is running the company either by
66. "I take the phrase 'governance' to mean the collection of law and practice that regulates the
conduct of those in control of a business organization." Lawrence A. Cunningham, Comparative
Corporate Governance and Pedagogy, 34 GA. L. REV. 721, 722 (2000).
67. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
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selling their stock or, in some limited instances, voting, the directors
have the responsibility and power to manage the affairs of the
company. 68 Because of the potential agency costs that emanate from the
separation of ownership and control, the government (used here to refer
.to all levels of government) protects shareholders by mandating and
regulating periodic disclosure of the company's financial performance
and by imposing on directors the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care. 69
The government supports these obligations even further by attaching
civil, and increasingly criminal, sanctions for failure to adhere to them.
Within this narrative, discussions of corporate governance focus
almost exclusively on the relationship between the shareholders who
own the company, the senior executives who run it, and the directors
interposed between the two groups. The "governance" at issue is the
sum of structures most likely to reduce information and agency costs
caused by the separation of ownership and control. 70 Shareholders will
maintain their investment in the market if they receive reliable
information from management. 7' The term "trust," as used in this
paradigm, often refers to the shareholder's trust in the capital markets; it
is not a relational concept per se. Rules requiring "strong monitors" and
"transparent" financial reporting are intended to bring about this
systemic version of trust.72 Within this paradigm, the debate revolves
around the effectiveness of certain structures and the type of
discipline-government regulation or private markets-that best reduces
agency costs and creates a reliable market.
73
Classical discussions of corporate governance coincide with the more
68. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006).
69. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
70. Every theory of corporate governance is, at heart, a theory of power. In this view, the
corporation is a nexus of power relationships beyond being a nexus of contracts. The
corporate setting is rife with agency relationships in which certain parties have the ability
(power) to unilaterally affect the interests of other parties notwithstanding preexisting
contractual arrangements.
Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive Style, 29
DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 653 (2004).
71. The basic and simple notion is that if a country's legal regime provides more investor
protection, investors will be more willing to invest. That willingness will, in turn, translate
into: companies being able to raise more money, more quickly and cheaply; into deeper and
more liquid capital markets; and ultimately into economic growth.
Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley As Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise is
the Received Wisdom, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 1861 (2007).
72. Id. at 1858-59 (arguing "that-capital markets are improved by vigorous securities regulation
featuring mandatory disclosure requirements, insider trading prohibitions, strong public enforcement,
and provision of private remedies for defrauded investors").
73. Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002).
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primal debate over the communitarian view of the corporation versus the
contention that the corporation is no more than a nexus-of-contracts,74
existing primarily for the benefit of its shareholders. 75 Although nexus
adherents embrace corporate governance's importance, they
nevertheless reject much of the government's recent regulation as
unnecessary, ineffective, or overly costly.
76
Classical governance debates start with the same presumption: that
good governance provides the corporation's shareholders with accurate
financial information about their investment and that good governance
ultimately increases shareholder (and society's) wealth. Although
scholars within this group start from the same premise they still may
disagree over the source, specificity, and content of governance rules.
The debate thus focuses on the relative merits and drawbacks of
institutions such as markets, state courts and legislatures, or Congress
and administrative agencies. 77
Many of the reforms set forth in Sarbox 78 and in policies and
regulations promulgated by the SEC, the DOJ, and the United States
Sentencing Guidelines comfortably rest within the classical governance
paradigm. They seek to deter socially undesirable conduct through a
combination of structural changes; increased internal and external
monitoring and detection; and the addition of heightened sanctions as a
threat to those who fail to follow the law.79 By shifting more power to
independent directors, and external regulators and prosecutors, the
reforms improve the government's ability to deter and identify
74. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPoRATE LAW (1991).
75. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). For an argument that Dodge did
not stand for such a broad rule, see Blair & Stout, supra note 12 at 301-02 (arguing that court's decision
reflected special duties shareholders owe each other in close corporations).
76. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT
WE'VE LEARNED; HOW TO Fix IT (2006); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
77. For debates over regulation versus private ordering, see Romano, supra note 76; Butler &
Ribstein, supra note 76. For discussions of state versus federal regulation of corporations, see Marcel
Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV.
1573 (2005); Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas-The Securities and
Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP LAW. 79 (2005) ("The
SEC's new activism with respect to corporate governance can thus be analyzed as the latest maneuver in
a long running battle between federal and state authorities over the regulation of public corporations.").
78. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
79. "[W]histleblower statutes, Department of Justice policies, Securities and Exchange
Commission rules, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, and American Bar Association ethical rules for
attorneys... mean that more corporate wrongdoing will come to law enforcement's attention." Pamela
H. Bucy, Why Punish?: Trends in Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1287, 1287
(2007).
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wrongdoing before shareholders are unduly harmed, and to exact
retribution from wrongdoers when harm has already occurred.8 °
Corporate governance improves because the law transfers power to
some groups (independent directors and employees) and away from
others (managers); and places significant monitoring responsibility on
yet a third group (lawyers and auditors). These changes presumably
work by: (a) reducing the opportunities to engage in wrongdoing, (b)
reducing the benefits of ignoring others' wrongdoing, and (c) increasing
the likelihood that wrongdoers-and poor monitors-will be detected
and sanctioned either formally, informally, or both.
2. The Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance
A separate theory of corporate governance describes good governance
from the perspective of culture and ethics. 81 This view of corporate
governance resides comfortably within the body of literature that views
the corporation descriptively and prescriptively as a singular entity or
community, with responsibilities to stakeholders other than
shareholders. 82 Under the organizational paradigm of the corporation,
"'governance" is not merely a debate over certification requirements or
board member independence, but also includes substantial consideration
of the corporation's culture and the appreciation, or lack thereof, of
ethical norms 83 throughout the company and its board.
84
80. "[Sarbox]'s corporate governance provisions were aimed at restoring faith in the capital
markets by protecting investors, primarily by improving the accuracy and reliability of financial
reporting and by preventing corporate frauds." Prentice & Spence, supra note 71, at 1868.
81. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Terry Morehead Dworkin, Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A.
Schipani, Integrating Trends in Whistleblowing and Corporate Governance. Promoting Organizational
Effectiveness, Societal Responsibility, and Employee Empowerment, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 177, 179 (2002).
82. Id. See also William Arthur Wines & J. Brooke Hamilton III, Observations on the Need to
Redesign Organizations and to Refocus Corporation Law to Promote Ethical Behavior and Discourage
Illegal Conduct, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 43, 78-79 ("[T]he modem publicly traded corporation cannot be
explained by the classical model of property and contract. Such corporations should be treated as the
distinct creatures they are.").
83. The term "norm" has been defined generally as a practice that people follow regardless of the
existence of a formal rule or regulation demanding such conduct. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L.
Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001) (norms "represent those behavioral
rules and standards that are primarily, if not exclusively, enforced by the parties themselves"). Others
have attempted to categorize norms. See, e.g,, Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253 (1999) (describing three categories of norms: behavioral, customary and
obligatory); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in
Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55 (2003) (describing various substantive
and procedural norms).
84. See Douglas M. Branson, Teaching Comparative Corporate Governance: The Significance of
"Soft Law" and International Institutions, 34 GA. L. REV. 669, 670 (2000) (theorizing that "[s]elf-
regulation, peer pressure from within the national or international director fraternity, and a stronger,
540
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Corporate culture refers to the organization's commonly held beliefs,
"which are based on shared values, assumptions, attitudes and norms." 85
More concretely, the ethical behavior that the company expects of and
promises its employees, is "reflected by the corporation's mission
statement and code of ethics, the criteria for business decisions, the
words and actions of leaders, the handling of conflicts of interest, the
reward system, the guidance provided to employees concerning dealing
with ethical issues, and the monitoring system." 86 Under this paradigm,
well governed organizations are those companies that rely on their
official policies and reporting structures to communicate and affirm
abstract notions of fairness and honesty.
87
Unlike the classical notion of governance, the cultural component of
corporate governance focuses very little on the relationship between
management and the shareholder. It is far more interested in the
"company" as an organization and the relationship between management
and the company's rank-and-file employees. 88 Moreover, it defines that
relationship in normative terms. There is a proper way in which
employees ought to act with each other and with the outside world other
than maximizing the wealth of the company's owners.
89
Thus, compliance is not solely the result of an individual's rational
cost-benefit calculation, but rather a form of behavior that comes about
through complex social interactions within a given group, guided by
more universal sense of what business ethics require may have the potential to become strong
determinants of director and executive behavior").
85. Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations and their
Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron's Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1,
3 (2003).
86. Id.
87. For a more skeptical view of how norms function in corporate govemance, see Marcel
Kahan, The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1869 (2001).
88. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J
941, 970-79 (2007) (focusing on the organization's relationship with its employees and how that
relationship effects compliance). Larry Cata Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and
Nationalizing Corporate Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 327, 370-71
(2004).
89. See David Hess, Robert S. McWhorter & Timothy L. Fort, The 2004 Amendments to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Their Implicit Call for a Symbiotic Integration of Business Ethics,
11 FoRDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 725, 747 (2005) (organizations seeking more ethical cultures must
foster "three related but distinct kinds of trust" among employees). According to Hess et al., compliance
exists when employees harbor Hard Conviction, Real Confidence, and Good faith. Id. Hard Conviction
is the "trust" that results from strong laws that deter the rational employee from engaging in
wrongdoing. Id. Real Confidence "is about people living up to the promises they made, being honest,
treating others fairly, and producing products and services that are of high enough quality to satisfy
customers." Id. at 749. Finally, Good Faith is an intrinsic "passion" to do more than is required in order
to achieve a type of "moral excellence." Id. at 752. "To inspire individuals to do more than they are
required by duty to do, organizations should aim to create job satisfaction for employees, to provide
good leadership, and to be perceived as achieving justice within the organization." Id.
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commonly shared and understood norms such as trust and honesty,
which the organization in turn has nurtured and inspired.90 The creation
of the organization's ethical culture is generated both by the company's
directors and officers-who set the "tone at the top," by its lawyers and
accountants, 91 and by the multitude of mid-level managers who interact
with rank-and-file employees. 92  Once established, the norms that
characterize the company's culture presumably do a better job of
restraining wrongdoing than the tripartite combination of monitoring,
detection, and sanctions. 93 At the very least, norms supplement the law's
deterrent force.
94
Cultural governance theory places great emphasis on employee voice
and participation. As employees increase their voice within the
corporation, wrongdoing becomes more unlikely, in part because
employees feel constrained to do the right thing, and in part because
information flows more freely up and down the corporate ladder.
95
Governance is no longer a structural issue of how to dole out power
between shareholders, managers, and directors. Instead, it morphs into a
workplace issue whereby competing concerns are mediated and resolved
by the organization and its culture-building mechanism, the corporate
90. Id. See also Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 157, 163 (2000) (explaining that social norms shape conduct not merely as an additional
cost or benefit, but also by "ensuring that certain preferences will never be formed in the first place,
while others will be strongly held"). A norm that is merely an additional external cost (reputational
sanctions that accompany jail sentences, for example) is an "environmental" norm that employees will
ignore when the likelihood of detection is low. "Intrinsic" norms, by contrast, create compliance
regardless of the likelihood of detection because "adherence is a source of intrinsic affirmation." Id.
91. For a discussion of the corporate lawyer's role in generating and maintaining ethical norms
within the corporation, see generally Sarah Helene Duggin, The Pivotal Role of the General Counsel in
Promoting Corporate Integrity and Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 989 (2007).
92. See ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988);
Linda Klebe Trevino, Out of Touch: The CEO's Role in Corporate Misbehavior, 70 BROOK. L. REV
1195, 1201-02 (2005).
93. See Etzioni, supra note 90, at 164 ("compliance, when based on intrinsic forces such as guilt
is less costly and more stable than that based on extrinsic forces such as shame") (citing Dan M. Kahan,
Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997)). See also TOM R.
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of
Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1817, 1818 (2007) (arguing that "compliance decisions are based at
least as much on the perceived legitimacy of the law and prevailing norms in local context as any
deliberate risk calculation").
94. Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a
Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 549, 554 (1996) (empirical study of
social norms' deterrent effect on crime); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 1811, 1862 (2001). For an argument that enforcement supplements normative appeals for
compliance, see Leandra Lederman, The Interplay between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance,
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1462 (2003).
95. Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model to Encourage Corporate
Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. Rev. 1107, 1111 (2006).
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compliance program. 96
Whereas the classical governance approach relies on a combination of
institutional structures, incentives, and sanctions to deter wrongdoing-
implicitly presuming rational actors who engage in cost-benefit
analyses-cultural governance theory relies on education, mediating
institutions, and a more democratic workplace in which employees'
comments are solicited and valued. 97 Thus, in the cultural governance
paradigm, the corporate compliance program98 acts as a neutral third
party that mediates employee concerns and seeks out and corrects
problems when they are still new and presumably more easily solved. 99
Under this rubric, whistleblowing is a positive development because it
improves information flow within the firm and signals employees that
their voices are important and valued.' 00
Although they tend not to focus on sanctions as a means for
improving corporate culture, cultural governance theorists nevertheless
claim that companies should "reward" ethical conduct and discipline
unethical behavior. 1° 1 Although much of the cultural governance
literature fails to define the type and method of sanction that
corporations should apply, one might infer that the purpose of the
96. See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 319, 374-75 (2005) (praising Sarbanes-Oxley, particularly its whistleblowing
provisions, as a means of increasing "employee voice"); Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute
Resolution: Systems Design and the New Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 11, 14 (2005)
(suggesting that the "democratic character of dispute resolution at the governance level" may help
transform corporations into more democratic workplaces for rank-and-file employees).
97. Callahan et al., refer to their model as "Business as a Mediating Institution" or "BMI."
Like quality management, which strives to address problems before they become
unmanageable, BMI anticipates that organizations will create opportunities for employees
to join structured, problem-solving groups that empower individuals to share insights to
address issues or, better yet, resolve them before they become dilemmas requiring a
response from upper management. Such open, participatory problem solving by those
most directly affected by an issue also reduces the likelihood of crises that might lead to
external whistleblowing.
Callahan et al., supra note 81, at 186.
98. I use the term "compliance" because that term has become the common phrase. See
Corporate Compliance Survey, supra note 6. Some scholars, most notably Lynn Sharp Paine, have
criticized organizations whose self-regulatory programs seek "compliance" over "integrity" as a means
of deterring wrongful conduct. See Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV.
Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 106. My use of the term is broader and intended to be value-neutral.
99. Callahan et al., supra note 81, at 186.
100. Id. at 195-96. See also Dallas, supra note 85 at 33 (praising confidential employee reporting
hotlines); Moberly, supra note 95, at 1152 (increased opportunities for whistleblowing can improve
overall decision-making).
101. See Dallas, supra note 85 at 34 (stating that "ethical behavior should be rewarded and
unethical behavior punished"); Regan, supra note 88, at 974 ("Virtually any program, of course, needs
to have sanctions available to penalize wrongdoers.").
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sanction should be to educate the corporation's stakeholders and
reinforce norms such as trust and loyalty. 10 2 After all, the compliance
program presumably achieves this result by creating a more transparent
and procedurally just workplace. 103
The cultural corporate governance discussion parallels much of the
law and social norms debate within the field of criminal law. 10 4 Law
enforcement approaches based solely on the "deterrence" model seek to
deter rational perpetrators by increasing sanctions and the likelihood that
they will be caught. 10 5 "Deterrence routines ... require intrusive, tough-
minded inspections, stringent prosecution of even minor violations,
expedited sanctioning procedures, and other deterrence-based actions
familiar to students of deterrence theory."'10 6 Normative approaches, by
contrast, focus on those factors that cause individuals to obey the law
even when there is little possibility that formal sanctions will arise from
such conduct.10 7 Normative approaches also tend to look at good or bad
conduct as the product of subconscious intuitions as opposed to
conscious, deliberate decisions.
1 08
Criminology literature, although relatively sparse on the topic of
corporate crime, suggests that whatever the value of formal sanctions,
moral norms are a better predictor of wrongdoing. 10 9 Thus, where
102. "[In a values-based compliance program] sanctions are likely to be regarded as a means of
reinforcing a cooperative scheme by ensuring that individuals do not exploit the willingness of others to
cooperate." Regan, supra note 88, at 974. "Leaders should model ethical behavior. They should, for
example, be truthful with the organization's stakeholders." Dallas, supra note 85, at 56.
103. See Regan, supra note 88, at 975 (citing Tom R. Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy
Adherence and Rule Following in Work Settings: The Value of Self-Regulatory Approaches, 70 BROOK.
L. REV. 1287, 1291-92 (2005)) (arguing that procedural-justice judgments are central to shaping
employee cooperative behavior).
104. "Perhaps surprisingly, the two literatures have coexisted up to this point with few attempts
made to combine their insights." N. Craig Smith, Sally S. Simpson & Chun-Yao Huang, Why Managers
Fail to Do the Right Thing: An Empirical Study of Unethical and Illegal Conduct, 17 Bus. ETHICS Q.
633, 638 (2007) (noting the coexistence of ethical decision-making literature and criminology).
105. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968). "Deterrence theory assumes that human behavior is reasoned and governed by free will and that
persons will choose to be lawful if the pain associated with offending is greater than the pleasure it may
bring." Smith et al., supra note 104, at 635 (citing CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
(Henry Paolucci trans., Macmillan 1963) (1764).
106. John T. Scholz, Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement, 6 LAW & POL'Y 385,
395-96 (1984).
107. Regan, supra note 88, at 970-71 (distinguishing between compliance programs "based solely
on promulgation and enforcement of rules and those that include what has been described as a values-
based component").
108. Id. at 944 ("A growing body of research suggests that a large portion of this process involves
automatic non-conscious cognitive and emotional reactions rather than conscious deliberation.").
109. Smith et al., supra note 104, at 637 ("The limited evidence from the corporate crime
literature indicates that formal legal sanctions may deter offending, but not for everyone.").
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corporate crime is concerned, governance approaches that seek to
"activate" social norms are more likely to be successful than those that
simply seek to enforce the letter of the law.' 
10
Much of this literature draws its strength from psychology and
sociology.' 1 Some of it is offered as a refinement of law and economics,
while some normative discussions appear to reject the utility of
deterrence models. Accordingly, Eric Posner has argued that a person
who acts according to social norms is in fact signaling a low discount
rate; she favors long term happiness over immediate wealth and
gratification. 112 Dan Kahan has explained normative constraints on
wrongdoing under his theory of "reciprocity."" 3 Relying on various
experiments demonstrating compliance with laws in the absence of any
likelihood of enforcement, Kahan theorizes that individuals contribute to
the collective good when they presume that everyone else is also
contributing to the collective good. 14 On the other hand, when
individuals perceive that they are being treated unfairly or that they have
become suckers, they go back to their own self-interested behavior and
ignore unenforced rules."l 5 Kahan has applied his theory of reciprocity
primarily to discussions of street crime and community policing, but one
could imagine the theory of reciprocity existing as easily within the
corporate sphere.' 16
As applied to corporations, the law and social norms movement
predicts that corporate employees will comply with norms when they
perceive "procedural justice" within their community. That is, they must
believe that the organization that employs them treats them objectively
110. Paine, supra note 98, at 110-11; Regan, supra note 88, at 972 (arguing that effective
compliance programs will combine aspects of both "values- and deterrence-based" approaches).
11l. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (2005); TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
OBEY THE LAW (1990).
112. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).
113. See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 71 (2003); Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 CAL. L.
REv. 1513 (2002).
114. See supra note 113. See also Regan, supra note 88 at 972-73 (arguing that an organization
stressing values inspires greater sense of identification and cooperation from its employees).
115. Kahan's theory presumes, nevertheless, a rational cost-benefit calculus, albeit over a period
of time. The individual in Kahan's world cooperates because he presumes others will cooperate and that
he will be enriched by mutual cooperation. See Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective
Action, and Law, supra note 113, at 72. Kahan's notion of reciprocity is therefore different from other
normative theories, wherein individuals engage or forbear in specified conduct regardless of perceived
collective or individual benefits.
116. Indeed, Paternoster and Simpson's 1996 experimental study of corporate crime suggests that
norms matter in restraining corporate crime at least as much as pure deterrence strategies. See
Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 94, at 571 (finding that informal sanctions were likely to deter
misconduct in corporate settings).
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and with respect." 17 This in turn requires a certain level of transparency
and a system of sanctions that are both incremental and devoid of
personal or cultural bias.
By now, it should be clear that the structural and cultural approaches
to corporate governance are quite different. They rely on different
mechanisms to achieve both organizational compliance and individual
compliance within the organization:
Theory of Approach to Approach to Enforcement
Governance Organizational Individual Methods
Compliance Compliance emphasized
Structural Deterrence- Cost-benefit Monitoring,
Based Analysis Reporting and
(rational actor) Discipline
Cultural Values-Based Normative Education,
Training and
Mediation
The foregoing discussion admittedly simplifies a complex and evolving
literature. Nevertheless, it illuminates the larger differences between the
two movements, and helps us understand the tensions behind the
government's attempt to improve corporate governance in the wake of
Enron-era corporate accounting scandals.
3. Enron and the Convergence of Classical and Cultural Governance
The accounting scandals that came to the fore in 2001 created a great
crisis among corporate regulators and prosecutors. On one hand, the
spectacular frauds that had been brewing at WorldCom and Enron, along
with old-fashioned looting at Adelphia, demonstrated an embarrassing
weakness in the structural tools on which classical governance adherents
had previously relied. 1 8 Auditors and lawyers had failed to disclose
wrongdoing,119 while SEC regulators and enforcement agents had lacked
117. See Regan, supra note 88, at 975 (citing Tyler, supra note 103, at 1304).
118. The checks and balances that we thought would be provided by independent directors,
independent auditors, securities analysts, investment bankers, and... lawyers, too often
failed. The regulatory checks represented by the SEC and federal and state legal constraints
also proved inadequate, in meaningful part ... because of scarce resources and overly
protective case law and legislation.
Harvey J. Goldschmid, SEC Commissioner, Keynote Address at Fordham University School of Law
A.A. Sommer, Jr. Annual Lecture on Corporate Securities & Financial Law: Post-Enron America: An
SEC Perspective (Dec. 2, 2002), in 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 335, 343 (2003).
119. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning
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the proper resources to lean on companies and their monitors. 12' The
proper response, then, was to fill the holes with more enforcement.
At the same time, a number of observers attributed the accounting
fraud crises to unrestrained "greed" within the corporate sphere. 121 The
antidote for such greed, therefore, was moral reflection and training. If
we transform corporate officers and directors into better people, fraud
and similar wrongdoing will abate.
As a result of these two competing narratives, the government's
approach to improving corporate governance is dichotomous. For
example, in a speech announcing the creation of the Corporate Fraud
Task Force, a collection of law enforcement personnel tasked with
coordinating and publicizing the prosecutions of corporate executives
and companies, President George W. Bush stated:
At this moment, America's greatest economic need is higher ethical
standards, standards enforced by strict laws and upheld by responsible
business leaders. The lure of heady profits of the late 1990s spawned
abuses and excesses. With strict enforcement and higher ethical
standards we must usher in a new era of integrity in corporate
America. 122
Bush's speech presumes that increased enforcement and "higher ethical
standards" go hand in hand. Yet, as the HP episode suggests, there may
be times when enforcement activity interferes with the inculcation of
higher ethical standards.
Like the President, Congress has also embraced both approaches to
improving corporate governance. On one hand, many of the governance
reforms adopted by Congress in the wake of Enron are primarily
structural; they move power from one group to another.123 At the same
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 302 (2004) ("[D]uring the late 1990s, [gatekeeping] protections
seemingly failed, and a unique concentration of financial scandals followed, all involving the common
denominator of accounting irregularities." (citations omitted)).
120. See Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum-Out of Many, One: Why the United States Needs
a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 1, 51-52 (2005) ("Congress used its
control over the SEC's budget in the 1990s to hinder the agency's efforts to enforce the existing
securities regulations and to discourage the agency from proposing new, more stringent regulations to
protect investors. In response to the public outcry over the Enron and WorldCom scandals, Congress
reversed itself and increased the SEC's budget almost 33 percent to $716 million in 2003, from the $540
million that it received in 2002.") (citing Stephan Taub, SEC Boosting Big-Company Caseload,
CFO.coM, Mar. 9, 2004, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3012481?f-advancesearch); Karmel, supra
note 77, at 99 (describing Congress' denial of the SEC's budget request in the 1990's).
121. Richard W. Stevenson & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Corporate Conduct: The Overview; Fed
Chief Blames Corporate Greed; House Revises Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002, at Al.
122. President George W. Bush, Remarks on Corporate Crime (July 9, 2002) (transcript available
at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/07/09/national/main5l4592.shtml).
123. See Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christina J. Johnson, Managerialism, Legal Ethics, and
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 299, 304-06 (2004) (describing provisions in the
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time, other aspects appear, at least facially, to fall within the cultural
paradigm of governance; they are designed to improve the corporation's
cultural ethos.124 For example, Sarbanes-Oxley directs the corporation to
publicize whether it maintains a Code of Ethics for its officers and
directors; 12 5 to create and publicize a mechanism to channel allegations
of wrongdoing by employee whistleblowers;' 26 and to provide internal
and external attestations (by the company's outside auditor) of the
corporation's "internal controls."
' 127
Many of these corporate compliance requirements are not new;1
2 8
previous government policies and regulations, such as the United States
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (promulgated in 1991) and the
Department of Justice's charging guidelines for prosecutors (first
circulated in 1999), also encouraged or required corporations to create
and maintain compliance programs. 129
In the wake of Sarbox, however, both the Sentencing Guidelines and
the DOJ's prosecutorial charging criteria were altered to increase the
emphasis on corporate compliance. 130 The Organizational Sentencing
Act designed to shift power from management to independent directors).
124. Bucy, supra note 79, at 1291 ("[Sarbanes-Oxley] affected corporate culture by requiring
public companies to review their internal controls and disclose all material weaknesses in their financial
reporting systems.").
125. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 406, 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2006). Given the fact that Enron,
Tyco, and WorldCom all maintained codes of conduct prior to the disclosure of their respective
scandals, one might reasonably wonder as to Section 406's value in reducing fraud.
126. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006) (requiring establishment of
"procedures for... the confidential, anonymous submission by employees.., of concerns regarding
questionable accounting or auditing matters"). Section 806 protects any employee who assists in an
internal or external investigation from adverse action. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C.
1514A (2006) (providing civil liability for employers who retaliate against whistleblower employees);
18 U.S.C.A. 1513(e) (2008) (criminalizing retaliation against whistleblowers, explicitly including
termination of employment).
127. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2000).
128. One might argue that the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), which required
public corporations to maintain a set of internal accounting controls, gave birth to the modem corporate
compliance industry. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2006) (requiring companies registered with
SEC to keep records and system of internal accounting controls). Corporate Compliance Survey, supra
note 6, at 1760 (citing insider trading and defense contractor scandals along with FCPA).
129. Although the Delaware Supreme Court initially resisted a requirement that directors "install
and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to
suspect exists," Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963), the
compliance language contained in the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines and the increasing risk of
entity-level prosecutions eventually brought about a change of heart. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc.
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996) (directors acting "in good faith" ought to at least
ensure that a system of internal controls "exists"); Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d
362, 370 (Del. 2006) (confirming that boards retain an obligation to oversee the company's compliance
with the law).
130. "Sarbanes-Oxley attempts to improve organizational ethics by defining a code of ethics as
including the promotion of 'honest and ethical conduct,' requiring disclosure on the codes that apply to
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Guidelines, which already promised reduced sanctions for organizations
that boasted "effective" compliance programs, explicitly required the
participation of high-level personnel and periodic self-assessment. The
Department of Justice, meanwhile, issued a memo in 2003 written by
Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson (Thompson Memorandum).
In this memorandum, Thompson directed prosecutors to consider if the
company's compliance program was "well designed.'
131
Cultural governance adherents enthusiastically embraced a number of
the reforms in the Thompson Memorandum and the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines. 132  Presumably, they believed that these
mechanisms would encourage management's commitment to creating
and maintaining an ethical corporate culture across the firm. At the same
time, these reforms were consistent with classical corporate governance
goals insofar as they relied on sanctions to improve information flow
and increase putative investors' trust in the capital markets.1 33 Indeed, an
interesting alliance was forged during this time between corporate
culture theorists, and those who believed that strong government
sanctions were necessary to alter the cost-benefit analyses of both the
wrongdoers and monitors who had fallen down on the job. 134
Given the persistence of fraud and ethical misconduct after the
enactment of Sarbox, 135 one might reasonably wonder just how long this
senior financial officers, and including provisions to encourage whistleblowing." David Hess, A
Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes-Oxley and the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1781, 1782-83 (2007) (citations omitted).
13 1. The DOJ has since superseded the Thompson Memorandum with the McNulty
Memorandum. See McNulty Memorandum, supra note 8.
132. See, e.g., Callahan et al., supra note 81 at 191 (praising Sentencing Guidelines' "carrot and
stick" approach toward corporate compliance); Hess, supra note 130, at 1816 (arguing that as a result of
Sarbox and the Sentencing Guidelines, "we are moving in the direction of improving corporate
compliance programs and encouraging the managerial commitment necessary for firms to develop
ethical corporate cultures"); Hess et al., supra note 89, at 764 ("We believe that the Guidelines can serve
an additional, broader purpose-that is, supporting the components of trust we identified as Hard
Conviction, Real Confidence, and Good Faith.").
133. Langevoort, supra note 93, at 1831.
134. Board members, typified by Enron's lackadaisical board, were key among those whom
lawmakers presumed needed stronger incentives to prevent wrongdoing. See Troy A. Paredes, Enron:
The Board, Corporate Governance and Some Thoughts on the Role of Congress, in ENRON: CORPORATE
FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 504 (Nancy B. Rappaport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) ("Whether
or not any Enron director violated his or her fiduciary duties or engaged in fraud, the board's conduct
fell far short of what is expected and what is required for good corporate governance.").
135. See ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER, NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 25 (2007),
http://www.corporatecompliance.org/ContentNavigationMenu/Resources/Surveys/2007NationaBusine
ssEthicsSurvey.pdf ("Despite remedies available, businesses in the U.S. face an ethics risk at pre-Enron
levels."); PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRIME SURVEY 15 (2007),
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/l E0890149345149E8525737000705AFl/$file/
PwC_2007GECS.pdf ("Fraud remains an intractable problem.... The results of this research have
shown that the controls that have been implemented will not be sufficient to mitigate the risk of
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alliance will hold up. Whatever the impetus for reform, the
government's implementation of Sarbox and subsequent criminal
investigations of corporate entities suggests that the government is most
concerned with increasing its own power and information, as opposed to
improving corporate culture. 136 Indeed, in 2004, Professor Larry Cata
Backer cast Sarbox and its ilk as part of panoptic 137 increase in
government power through the delegation of monitoring and corporate
surveillance:
[T]he state has increased the breadth of its power to discipline those
persons it has deputized with surveillance duties. Indirectly, this is
accomplished by the construction of a system in which the state sits at the
top of a pyramid of monitoring by others.
138
From this perspective, compliance officers and whistleblowers, however
enthusiastically embraced by ethics scholars as the vanguard of a
different and more democratic workplace, are in fact quasi-public
monitors who serve more as a conduit between the company and the
State, rather than as one between the corporation's various
"stakeholders." 139
Backer's claim has been supported both by the charging criteria
contained in the Department's memo to prosecutors, and by the
implementation of that criteria over the last five years. Neither the
Thompson Memorandum, nor its successors, the McNulty and Filip
Memoranda, so much as mention the word "ethics." The word "culture"
appears once in the introductory letter preceding the McNulty
economic crime on their own."). Despite the survey evidence that fraud persists, the Corporate Fraud
Task Force's prosecutions have decreased in recent years. See Daphne Eviatar, Case Closed?, AM.
LAW.COM, Nov. 1, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?hubtype=Inside&id=l 1937350
22055#. The DOJ's explanation for the decrease is that "fraud is being detected by corporations
themselves." Id. This seems quite unlikely; if corporations were "themselves" detecting fraud, they
presumably would be reporting such fraud to government regulators and prosecutors. The more likely
explanation is that the government has, after a period of intense media interest, turned its resources
elsewhere.
136. See Backer, supra note 88. One might argue that this increase was merely one aspect of the
Bush administration's general approach to increasing executive power. See John S. Baker, Jr.,
Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal Prosecution, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 310, 348 (2004)
(noting that the DOJ's response to corporate crime emerged at the same time as the Bush
administration's response to terrorism).
137. The panopticon was Jeremy Bentham's idea of a circular prison whose prisoners know they
are surveilled at all times. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGs 29-95 (Miran Bozovic ed.,
Verso, 1995), available at http://cartome.org/panopticon2.htm.
138. Backer, supra note 88, at 345.
139. See id. ("With [Sarbox], the SEC can more effectively control and process information
through its web of deputies, especially whistle-blowing employees, officers faced with certification
requirements, outside directors with fiduciary duties, auditor and outside counsel with detect and report
obligations.").
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Memorandum, wherein the Deputy Attorney General opines that,
"Indicting corporations for wrongdoing enables the government to
address and be a force for positive change of corporate culture .... 1,40
One must wonder if the cultural governance adherents meant
something more than the crude threat of indictment when they
championed Sarbanes-Oxley and the revised Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines as a means of improving corporate culture. Simply
threatening an entity with criminal liability for its employees' criminal
acts has long been recognized as an unsound approach for achieving
deterrence. As Jennifer Arlen and Renier Kraakman pointed out nearly a
decade ago, pure strict liability regimes do not work when a corporate
compliance program's increased likelihood of uncovering harm
outweighs its ability to prevent such harm. 
141
Arlen and Kraakman concluded that the way to get around this
problem was to enforce a "mixed" or composite liability system,
whereby the company would suffer some baseline penalty for its
employees' wrongdoing, and then receive a more stringent-or more
lenient-penalty depending on its efforts to comply with the law.142 The
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines and Department's charging
criteria arguably implemented this type of liability by providing
probation, lesser sanctions for companies that demonstrated adequate
"cooperation" and effective "compliance," or both.
Unfortunately, the application of composite liability has generated
problems in its application. Because the collateral costs of indictment
are so high, the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines are rarely used
and most corporations resolve their problems beforehand in negotiations
with prosecutors.' 43 Second, prosecutors maintain a tremendous amount
of power over corporations, in part because the corporation lacks a
viable alternative (the collateral costs rule out the possibility of trial) and
because there exists little oversight over prosecutorial plea-
bargaining.144 Third, due to lack of expertise or political desire, the
government has largely declined to define the term "compliance" with
specificity. Instead, the government has focused primarily on the issue
of fakery, i.e., the corporation's pretense of cooperation after the fact or
140. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 8, at 2.
141. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 65, at 708. See also Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially
Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994).
142. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 65, at 694.
143. See Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, The Power of the Corporate Charging Decision
Over Corporate Conduct, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 306 (Mar. 20, 2007) ("[T]he initial threat of
corporate criminal charges has far broadei and deeper effects on American businesses' behavior than
does the prospect of sentencing itself.").
144. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 Ind. L.J. 1035 (2008).
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cosmetic compliance before the fact:
Too often business organizations, while purporting to cooperate with a
Department investigation, in fact take steps to impede the quick and
effective exposure of the complete scope of wrongdoing under
investigation. The revisions make clear that such conduct should weigh in
favor of a corporate prosecution. 145
As a result of its emphasis on sham compliance programs, the DOJ has
more or less failed to aid organizations in formulating or otherwise
testing their ethical climate prior to the disclosure of a corporate
scandal.1 46 By declining to define or review the details of corporate
compliance programs in advance, the Department has effectively
divorced itself from subsequent compliance failure. 147 Instead, once a
scandal occurs, the DOJ can use its power as leverage to demand greater
cooperation with the government's investigation in order to compensate
for the perceived prior "ineffectiveness" of the company's compliance
program. 
148
Post-scandal cooperation requires the company to engage in practices
that are in direct tension with the building blocks of the practices that
organizational theorists advocate. For the government prosecutor, the
compliance program is primarily an extenuated arm of the state and only
secondarily an entity devoted to forging more trust and transparency
across the firm. 14 9 To avoid indictment, corporate entities have been
expected to waive the entity's attorney-client privilege and hand over the
145. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3.
146. The Filip Memorandum states that the Department has no "formulaic requirements" for
corporate compliance programs. Filip Memorandum, supra note 8, at 15. The previous iteration of the
memorandum stated that the DOJ had no "formal guidelines" for such programs. McNulty
Memorandum, supra note 8, at 14.
147. Superiors do not like to give detailed instructions to subordinates. The official reason for
this is to maximize subordinates' autonomy. The underlying reason is, first, to get rid of
tedious details.... Perhaps more important, pushing details down protects the privilege of
authority to declare that a mistake has been made.
JACKALL, supra note 92, at 20.
148. See Backer, supra note 88, at 345 ("[T]he state maintains a great capacity for surveillance
through the use of its power to extract 'cooperation' from the 'observed' corporation."); Michael A.
Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation and "Good Corporate Citizenship," 76 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 979, 980 (2002) (observing that prosecutors define "good corporate citizens" as "cooperating fully
in any investigation").
149. During the investigation of KPMG's employees, prosecutors urged KPMG's lawyers to tell
their employees to be completely "open" during interviews with government agents because these
statements would provide "good material for cross-examination," United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d
315, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Stein II), and to de-emphasize, in company communications, the employees'
right to counsel "to increase the chances that KPMG employees would agree to interviews without
consulting or being represented by counsel." United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 347 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (Stein I).
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results of any internal investigation; 150 refrain from paying attorneys
fees for indicted employees; 151 threaten uncooperative employees with
termination unless they speak freely with government agents; 152 accept
the government's placement of an outside monitor who reports primarily
to prosecutors and not to the corporation's board or shareholders;' 53 and
sanction employees who voice disagreement with factual assertions
contained in public deferred prosecution agreements between the
government and the corporate entity. 154 Although several of these
government demands ultimately were rebuffed, they fell apart not
because of voluntary government forbearance (much less "negotiated
governance" between the government and regulated firms), but rather
because the individual employee-targets of the government's
investigation successfully challenged the government's actions in
court. 
15 5
150. In the wake of the KPMG debacle, the McNulty Memorandum attempted to place internal
controls over the manner by which prosecutors could request waivers by corporations. See McNulty
Memorandum, supra note 8, at 8-11. It was superseded in August 2008 by the Filip Memorandum,
which discarded the McNulty framework in favor of an inquiry as to whether the corporation has
provided "relevant facts" to the government in the course of its investigation. See Filip Memorandum,
supra note 8, at 9-12. The waiver of the corporation's attorney-client privilege in corporate
investigations and its chilling effect on employee communication has been discussed at length. See, e.g.,
Griffin, supra note 7, at 347 (arguing that corporate waiver of privilege has placed corporate counsel in
"an untenable position" with employees); David M. Zomow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a
Brave New World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
147, 153-55 (2000).
151. Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 344.
152. Stein II, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 318. Deputy Attorney General Filip has since stated that
prosecutors "will no longer consider whether the corporation has retained or sanctioned employees in
evaluating [the defendant corporation's] cooperation" but that the government will continue to consider
retention of such employees in evaluating the corporation's compliance program. See Letter from
Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip to Senators Patrick J. Leahy and Arlen Specter, July 9, 2008,
available at https://www.abanet.org/litigation/committees/criminal/docs/O708_filipletter.pdf.
153. Bristol Myer Squibb's agreement, for example, explicitly discusses the role of its monitor as
a conduit to the United States Attorneys' Office. See Richard S. Gruner, Three Painful Lessons:
Corporate Experience with Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 1623 Prac. L. Inst./Corp. 5 I, 66 (2007).
154. For example, AOL's deferred prosecution agreement promises that none of AOL's agents or
employees will make,
[A]ny public statement. .. contradicting any statement of fact set forth in the Statement
of Facts [in this agreement]. Any such willful, knowing and material contradictory public
statement... shall constitute a breach of this Agreement, and AOL thereafter would be
subject to prosecution as set forth in paragraph 17 of this Agreement. The decision of
whether any public statement by any such person ... has breached this Agreement shall
be at the sole reasonable discretion of the Department of Justice.
Id.
155. See Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 362-65 (criticizing the Thompson Memorandum); Stein 11,
440 F. Supp. 2d at 319 (suppressing statements by KPMG employees because they believed they would
be fired by KPMG unless they spoke with government agents); United States v. Stein, 488 F. Supp. 2d
350 (S.D.N.Y 2007) (Stein III) (finding that the government's conduct as a whole violated the KMPG
UNIVERSITY OF CINCIAWATI LA WREVIEW [Vol.77
Thus, the corporate "tone at the top" that has, to date, most
preoccupied the government is not the tone of transparency or
procedural justice (or any of the usual components of an ethical culture)
that management establishes with the company's employees, but rather,
the "tone" the company's general counsel adopts when he or she speaks
with federal agents and prosecutors during the government's
investigation. 
156
It is striking how much the reality of corporate policing conflicts with
the theory of cultural governance. Under cultural governance theory,
executives refrain from wrongdoing because of the trust and loyalty they
feel toward organizations that have treated them with fairness and
respect. 157 Fairness and respect, however, require the individuals
running such organizations to be honest with their subordinates and
operate in a transparent manner. Internal policing has very little to do
with these concepts.
This is not to say that all compliance programs and reporting
initiatives are devoid of value. Depending on how they are implemented,
they may increase the perceived likelihood of detection and deter
managers who are considering engaging in wrongdoing. They also may
improve corporate culture by signaling employees that corporate
management takes its legal obligations seriously. 5 8 Nevertheless, to the
extent the government has transformed the corporation's compliance
officer into a corporate policeman, the government's conduct threatens
the ethical corporate culture it claims to desire.
159
The ethical reforms contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are therefore
classical enforcement mechanisms dressed up in cultural norms'
clothing. The idea of using compliance and whistleblowing to create a
more democratic, less hierarchical, and more transparent corporate
institution is just that: an idea. In reality, the federal government freely
uses the corporation's compliance program-including its
whistleblowing channel, internal investigations, and in-house counsel-
as a means of identifying and sanctioning wrongdoers.
defendants' 5th and 6th Amendment rights).
156. As one of the former prosecutors of Bernie Ebbers explained, "[W]hether the company really
intends it or not, in the government's view, the ultimate purpose of its role is to help the government
convict its former employees." David Anders, Crirninalization of Corporate Law, 2 J. Bus. & TECH. L.
71, 72 (2006).
157. Hess et al., supra note 89, at 750.
158. See Regan, supra note 88, at 974 (contending that a combination of value-based and
deterrence-based programs best achieve overall compliance goals, although deterrence should not
predominate).
159. "Too much control through monitoring and punishment can lead to distrust ... as well as to a
reduction in intrinsic motivations (and the notion of Good Faith)." Hess et al., supra note 89, at 757.
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Sarbanes-Oxley will continue to stir debate as either a needed
response to unrestrained greed, or as a pastiche of politically motivated
requirements that were either unnecessary or downright harmful to
shareholders and corporations. 160  Whatever the merits of these
individual arguments, it is clear that there has been little consideration of
the resulting tension between corporate governance and corporate
policing. More important to this discussion, there has been even less
consideration of how specific corporate policing techniques that utilize
or depend on deception might undermine the very governance values
that Sarbox and the government's renewed enforcement efforts were
intended to bring about. 16
1
B. Corporate Law Enforcement and Deception
The previous section explored the theoretical underpinnings of post-
Enron corporate compliance policies and suggested that the
government's implementation of its policies deeply conflict with at least
some of the theories that support the notion of the "self-regulating"
corporation.
This section explores why the typical corporate compliance program
might rely on deception in accomplishing its task of monitoring and
reporting wrongdoing. As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the
government's delegation of the police function to the corporate
compliance program raises questions about how the entity goes about
collecting information necessary to prevent and remediate wrongdoing.
Despite best efforts taken in "good faith," the corporate policeman may
find it awfully difficult to obtain information necessary to prevent harm.
As a result, corporate compliance programs may resort to using
deceptive techniques to identify corporate crime, particularly the types
of crimes that have characterized many of the scandals earlier in the
decade.
Although specific wrongdoing varies across industries and firms,
fraud is the violation that most commonly threatens the public corporate
entity, particularly when it infects the company's accounting and
reporting functions, thus preoccupying the public corporation's
160. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005). See also Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley
Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And it Just Might Work), 35 CoNN. L. REV. 915 (2003) (agreeing
that Sarbox is an unruly combo of multiple policies and requirements).
161. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus
Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023 (2003); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's
About the Gatekeepers, Stupid, " 57 Bus. LAW. 1403 (2002); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of
the Enron Board and the New Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CoNN. L. REV. 1125 (2003).
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compliance program. 162
Fraud is a broadly generic type of wrongdoing "that encompasses the
multifarious and often ingenious means by which one individual can
gain an advantage over another through deliberate false suggestion,
concealment, or misrepresentation of the truth."'163 Although the board-
level leak at HP did not constitute fraud, it nevertheless was deceptive in
that it was carried out in secret and sowed uncertainty and distrust in the
rest of the Board. Given the failure of HP's prior attempt to identify its
leaker through overt means, it was not surprising that Patricia Dunn and
HP's investigators concluded that a certain level of deception was
necessary to identify the person who was leaking information to the
press.
Because fraud and related types of wrongdoing rarely take place in
public and are often not easy to grasp or understand, the corporation will
have to do more than simply demand information. Therefore, it is crucial
to consider the extent to which corporate law enforcement actually relies
on deception; and how such reliance affects the corporation's culture
and ultimately its compliance with law. Because we know so much more
about public law enforcement, and because corporations are often urged
to achieve the same results through "self-policing," I focus first on how
public law enforcement collects information.
1. How the Government Obtains Information
The government uses a combination of four strategies to obtain
information necessary to achieve its enforcement goals: relying on
volunteers as a source of information, demanding information, paying
for information, and using different forms of deception to extract
information.
First, the government receives information from individuals who
voluntarily provide it. Some of these individuals are victims of crime
and seek the government's help in redressing their injuries. Others,
however, are merely good Samaritans who have come forward simply
out of a desire to contribute to their community's collective well being.
Second, the government may demand information. Through yearly
filing requirements, grand jury subpoenas, and search warrants, the
government maintains an impressive array of tools designed to pry
information from unwilling sources. The government's power to
demand information is fairly broad, although restrained by judicial and
162. See Hess, supra note 130, at 1782.
163. Daniel T. Otsas, When Fraud Pays: Executive Self-Dealing and the Failure of Self-Restraint,
44 AM. Bus. L.J. 571 (2007).
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legislative oversight. For most records (including records of phone calls,
bank and credit card records, and employment documents maintained by
employers), the government's burden is fairly low. Assuming it is acting
in good faith, the government can obtain most, if not all, of these
documents through grand jury subpoenas. 164
The strategy of demanding information has its limits. Criminals may
attempt to subvert the government's demands by hiding or altering
information. Companies might submit false or misleading reports.
Criminals might keep money in the form of cash in order to evade the
well-known reporting requirements that apply to financial institutions.
Fortunately, the government may employ a third strategy: it can pay
for information. Local police, and federal agencies such as the Federal
Bureau of Inspection (FBI) and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), quite
famously employ confidential informants or "Cl's." 165 A CI may be paid
in one of two ways; either his handlers will pay him in cash for
information or the government wili pay him in the form of a reduced
criminal sentence. 166 The latter transaction is often referred to as
"cooperation" in criminal law circles.1 67 In exchange for the defendant's
cooperation in convicting his co-conspirators and other criminals, the
defendant receives a lesser sentence in prison. Defendants who are most
likely to follow through on this exchange are those who have been
apprehended, against whom the government has built a strong case, and
who are facing a substantial amount of prison time if they refuse to
cooperate.
The government's ability to pay for information, in turn, relies on two
related principles: broad criminal liability and harsh penalties. The
breadth of the criminal law and the certainty of harsh sanctions create
"value" on the government's end of the cooperator transaction: In
exchange for the defendant's information, the government can offer
significant "breaks" on legal penalties.
1 68
However, the payment strategy has its limits. Some defendants will
164. Prosecutors routinely issue subpoenas on behalf of the grand juries and direct the course of
the "grand jury's" investigation. "As a practical matter, grand jury subpoenas are almost universally
issued by and through federal prosecutors." Stem v. U.S. Dist. Court, 214 F.3d 4, 16 n.4 (lst Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted).
165. Alan Feuer & Al Baker, Officers' Arrests Put Spotlight on Police Use of Informants, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2008, at A25 (FBI maintains 15,000 informants and DEA maintains approximately
4,000).
166. Id.
167. Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
911, 932 (2006).
168. Professor Katyal has explained in detail how the broad doctrine of conspiracy aids law
enforcement in extracting information from defendants seeking to reduce potential prison sentences. See
Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1328 (2003).
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value silence more than the government's offer for a reduced sentence.
This is particularly the case where the government's evidence is weak
and conviction without assistance is not likely. Moreover, in some ill-
defined subset of cases, defendants will purport to accept the
government's offer of a lesser sentence, but deliver tainted goods in the
form of false or incomplete information.
Accordingly, when demanding and paying for information max out
the government's returns, the government will turn to a fourth strategy:
it will trick or deceive the defendant into providing the information. It
may do this in one of two ways. First, it may permit, or indeed,
encourage its agents to lie to targets during the course of an
investigation, such as when the police falsely inform a suspect that his
fingerprints have been found on a weapon when in fact no such
fingerprints exist. 169 Interestingly enough, the purpose of the lie is to
convince the defendant to sell his "information"-invariably, his
confession-to the government. By lying, the government agent
convinces the defendant to devalue his silence and simultaneously
implies that the government's "payment" for such information is in fact
much better than it really is. The common refrain is the police's claim
(often false) that if the defendant just confesses, the interrogation will
end and courts will deal with him leniently. It is important to note here
that unlike the payment scenario, the bargain struck by the defendant is
based on entirely false premises: The government in these situations
often has no intention of treating the defendant leniently, whether he
confesses or not.
A second way the government uses deception to pry information from
targets (before their Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached) is
by having a government agent pose as a fellow co-conspirator.'70 One
might see this as yet another way to convince the defendant to "sell" his
information in exchange for a benefit (money, new suppliers or
customers, assistance in committing a crime, or sheer camaraderie) that
is in fact bogus.
169. The Sixth Circuit reinstated the conviction of a defendant whose confession was obtained
during a police interrogation in which the police falsely informed a defendant accused of kidnapping and
robbery that the defendant's fingerprints had been found on the victim's van, that she had identified him
from a photographic array, and that she was waiting outside the interrogation room, "prepared to
identify the assailant." Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062, 1070 (6th Cir. 1994) ("[the defendant's]
confession was obtained by means of legitimate law-enforcement methods that withstand constitutional
scrutiny").
170. Once the target has become a criminal defendant whose Sixth Amendment right has attached,
the government must tread more carefully with its use of co-conspirators and undercover agents. See
generally Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 178-80 (1985) (government cannot exploit co-conspirator's
meetings with indicted defendant, but may use evidence collected in undercover capacity in prosecution
for crimes not the subject of indictment).
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Obviously, most investigations feature combinations of all of these
strategies. Out of a sense of civic duty, a neighbor voluntarily advises
the police that the apartment next to hers is inhabited by drug dealers.
Through a search warrant, the government demands entry into the
apartment and finds drugs there, as well as a tenant who previously
intended to sell those drugs. The government then offers to pay that
tenant a lower sentence, provided he agrees to wear an undisclosed
microphone at his next meeting with his supplier, at which point his
deception effectively tricks the supplier into making incriminating
statements.
The law grants public law enforcement agents wide latitude in using
and combining these strategies, many of which involve some level of
secrecy, surprise, and deception. Law enforcement agencies and other
observers defend the use of these tools as necessary implements of
successful enforcement and deterrence. 17 1 Indeed, deceptive techniques
have become so ingrained in the law enforcement psyche that they are
often promoted as first-resort techniques among agents, prosecutors,
172
and the general public.
Federal law does not govern the details of undercover policing.
Undercover agents and informants routinely solicit, attend, and record
meetings with criminal targets.' 73 As long as at least one of those
171. "The use of undercover techniques ... is essential to the detection, prevention, and
prosecution of white collar crimes, public corruption, terrorism, organized crime, offenses involving
controlled substances, and other priority areas of investigation." John Ashcroft, Attorney General, The
Attorney General's Guidelines on Federal Bureau of Investigation Undercover Operations (May 30,
2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/olp/fbiundercover.pdf [hereinafter Attorney General's
Guidelines]. "In most democracies, political elites, legal actors, and critics agree that undercover
investigations are in some sense a necessary evil." Jacqueline E. Ross, The Place of Covert Surveillance
in Democratic Societies. A Comparative Study of the United States and Germany, 55 AM. J. COMP. L.
493, 493 (2007). "This technique is a critically effective means of investigating organized, clandestine,
sophisticated criminal activity which is not readily susceptible to detection by traditional investigative
techniques." Jay B. Stephens, Setting the Sting, Minimizing the Risk. The Government's Case for an
Effective Undercover Investigative Technique, I CRIM. JUST. 14 (1986-87). See also Saros, supra note
14, at 28 ("[No comprehensive law enforcement program could succeed without the effective use of
undercover investigations.").
172. See Ross, supra note 171, at 494 (observing that training for federal prosecutors in Illinois
includes the following instruction: "Before you subpoena documents; before you call witnesses to the
grand jury; before you consider conventional sources of evidence; make sure to exhaust all undercover
options first. This should become your mantra."). "The use of undercover techniques is ubiquitous."
Bernard W. Bell, Theatrical Investigation: White-Collar Crime, Undercover Operations, and Privacy,
II WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 151, 151 (2002). See also Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors,
53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 396 (1992) ("[O]ver the last twenty years, the scope and variety of undercover
activity has surged.").
173. For a discussion of the historical use of undercover agents and informants by police
departments and public law enforcement agencies, see John Ortiz Smykla & Henry Hamilton,
Guidelines for Police Undercover Work: New Questions About Accreditation and the Emphasis on
Procedure over Authorization, II JUST. Q. 135, 136-38 (1994).
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undercover agents or informants is present while recording
conversations with the targets of the investigation, the federal
wiretapping laws do not apply. 174 Nor are undercover investigations
governed, for the most part, by any omnibus federal statute. 175 Despite
some interest following the Abscam investigation that embroiled
Congress in 1980, Congress has shown fairly little interest in regulating
or limiting the scope of undercover criminal investigations.1 76 To the
contrary, federal laws that prohibit deceptive conduct routinely exempt
law enforcement agencies. 
177
The judiciary also exercises fairly little control over undercover
investigations. 178  The government cannot engage in behavior that
"shocks the conscience," and it cannot entrap the defendant, but these
are very easy hurdles to clear thanks to a number of court opinions.
7 9
Accordingly, the strongest restraints on government undercover
activities are those contained in internal agency guidelines,' 80 and state
law to a lesser extent. 181
The government's flexibility in implementing multiple strategies of
collecting information reduces the criminal's access to "detection
avoidance" measures-the costly actions that criminals take in order to
reduce the likelihood of being caught, punished, or both. 182 Perpetrators
are likely to have a more difficult time dissuading judges and juries from
evidence obtained through wiretaps and recorded conversations with
174. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). Federal courts consider the telephone or
video surveillance conducted in the presence of an undercover agent or informant to be "consensual."
Some state laws, however, restrict the ability of law enforcement agents to engage in such recordings.
See generally Melanie L. Black Dubis, The Consensual Electronic Surveillance Experiment. State
Courts React to United States v. White, 47 VAND. L. REV. 857 (1994).
175. Ross, supra note 171, at 511.
176. Id. at 511. See also Goldwasser, supra note 3.
177. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 6821(c) (2006) (law enforcement agencies excluded from prohibiting
deceptive measures used to obtain information from financial institutions).
178. Gershman, supra note 172, at 395-96.
179. See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.
423 (1973).
180. See Attorney General's Guidelines, supra note 171. See also Smykla & Hamilton, supra note
173, at 136-38 (observing deficient and in some cases, nonexistent, guidelines for undercover
investigations within local police departments).
181. Although the DOJ previously took the position that federal prosecutors were not subject to
state professional rules of responsibility, Congress overturned this judgment with its passage of the
McDade Amendment, which prohibits prosecutors and agents from contacting represented defendants,
with certain exceptions. See generally Gregory B. LeDonne, Recent Development, Revisiting the
McDade Amendment: Finding the Appropriate Solution for the Federal Government Lawyer, 44 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 232 (2007). For a more general discussion of state law constraints, see Dubis, supra note
174.
182. See Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1333 (2006).
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informants.1
83
In instances of overt contact, the government may still employ a fair
amount of deception to extract information from witnesses and suspects.
The police may lie to suspects about the purpose of an interview; the
strength of the government's case; and the magnitude of punishment the
defendant may receive if he cooperates or does not cooperate with the
government. 184 Because it produces mixed results, the use of deception
in one-on-one interrogations has become more controversial.' 85
Deceptive interrogation techniques invoke concern because they
interfere with the defendant's autonomy and threaten to produce false
confessions.
186
Although deception is a useful enforcement strategy, it eventually
loses some of its power over time. If it is well known that police lie to
suspects about the strength of a case, eventually savvy suspects-
recidivists in particular-will call the government's bluff during police
interrogations. Similarly, perpetrators who become aware of undercover
investigation techniques will eventually find a way to evade those
techniques. Some drug dealers will limit the number of buyers with
whom they deal. Others will routinely switch or "drop" cell phones.'
87
As a result, deception-fueled police techniques may catch the laziest and
least sophisticated criminals, while their smarter, more creative, and
more sophisticated counterparts go further underground.
Nevertheless, even as it leads to fewer prosecutions, deception-fueled
detection avoidance is beneficial insofar as it imposes a cost on
criminals. A drug dealer who fears infiltration of his business by
undercover agents may sell cocaine to a very select group of clients that
he knows very well. His risk management strategy, however, may
reduce the profitability of his business. 1
88
Accordingly, apart from community-based pressures to disclose its
operations, the government itself will harbor independent, deterrence-
based reasons to partially disclose its deceptive practices. When the
183. See Ross, supra note 171, at 510 (citing Heymann's testimony in 1981).
184. See generally Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN.
L. REV. 425 (1996).
185. Texas Tech Law Review's 2007 Symposium issue contains a number of thoughtful articles
addressing the topic of police deception during interrogations. See Symposium, Citizen Ignorance,
Police Deception, and the Constitution: A Symposium, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1077 (2007).
186. George C. Thomas III, Regulating Police Deception During Interrogation, 39 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 1293, 1318 (2007) ("Police deception that would leave a suspect feeling hopeless about his chance
of avoiding a conviction creates an atmosphere in which a sufficiently attractive offer of leniency can
induce an innocent suspect to confess.").
187. See, e.g., Bruce D. Johnson & Mangai Natarajan, Strategies to Avoid Arrest: Crack Sellers'
Response to Intensified Policing, 14 AM. J. POLICE 49 (1995).
188. Alternately, he may simply pass those costs onto his customers.
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government announces that it has employed certain deceptive
techniques, it will increase the criminals' perceived likelihood of
detection. 189 Deception by police increases distrust by and among
criminals and thereby reduces group conduct. If the government can
engineer a world where every co-conspirator is conceivably an
undercover agent or informant, group conduct will become disfavored.
Conspiracies will become smaller, less stable, and less viable.
1 90
In sum, public law enforcement agencies use multiple strategies to
accumulate the information necessary to apprehend, incapacitate and
deter wrongdoers. Although the government is subject to oversight over
its execution of some of these strategies (courts must approve search
warrants and wiretaps, for example), it nevertheless possesses a
remarkable amount of access to the information it wants and needs.
2. Information Flow Within the Corporation
If the government uses a combination of voluntarily provided
information, demands, payments, and trickery to amass information
necessary to achieve its enforcement goals, how does the corporation
accomplish the same ends?
The corporation presumably organizes itself to efficiently obtain and
filter relevant information to its officers, directors, and shareholders.
Executive officers make decisions regarding the short- and long-term
course of the company on the basis of information supplied by mid- and
lower-level employees. Directors vote on important company matters on
the basis of information supplied to them by executive officers and
external auditors. Shareholders rely on directors to punish or reward
officers on the basis of the information that directors have received.
Information is the life-blood of the American corporation.
The right information, however, does not always make its way to the
right place. Officers and employees may fail to provide adequate or
reliable information; directors may decline to act on or disclose such
information to shareholders. 191 Efficient markets are supposed to correct
this problem over time. To the extent markets lack efficiency, securities
laws correct the problem by requiring disclosure backed by strong
189. See generally Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-
First Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 5 (1998) ("deterrence is ultimately a perceptual phenomenon").
190. Hay, supra note 15, at 395 (arguing that government uses undercover sting operations "to
sow distrust among crooks so that (ideally) every crook is afraid that his confederates or victims are
[government] agents"). See also Katyal, supra note 168.
191. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs, and Informational Monopolies: The
Missing Link in Corporate Governance, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2005).
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sanctions for lying, and internal and external monitoring. Together,
markets and regulation improve the quality of information that flows up
and out through the corporation.
Nevertheless, some people will continue to lie or misrepresent
information. As the lies become more complex and cheaters work in
concert to hide their lies, detection becomes exponentially more
difficult. Accordingly, it is interesting to consider how the four methods
of information-gathering play out in the corporate enforcement context.
First, the corporate investigator may receive information voluntarily
through the company's whistleblowing channel. Sarbanes-Oxley
supporters would say that this is exactly what Congress intended when it
required public companies to establish hotlines for confidential and
anonymous reporting, and when it put in place stringent laws protecting
employees against retaliation. Yet, a recent survey by the Ethics
Resource Center, a national non-profit ethics resource group, found that
many employees fail to report misconduct because of a combination of
fear of retaliation and sense of futility. 192 The employees' explanation
for not coming forward is interesting because the Ethics Resource
Center also found that the actual rate of retaliation is quite low.193 Either
employees perceive a higher likelihood of retaliation than actually
exists, or retaliation itself remains under-reported and undetectable.
Whatever the explanation for the Ethics Resource Center's data, it is
safe to assume that corporate compliance programs will find voluntary
reporting channels insufficient to root out wrongdoing. How then, might
the corporation use the remaining three tools of acquiring information?
Like the government, the corporation might also demand information
from its employees. On the surface, corporate law enforcement may
appear more agile in its ability to acquire information by force. Public
law enforcement is bound by the Constitution, federal and state laws,
and internal agency guidelines. In contrast, unless state action is present,
corporate law enforcement is not bound by the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth
Amendments of the Constitution.' 
94
Nevertheless, corporate investigators must contend with a patchwork
quilt of workplace privacy statutes, 195 labor laws,1 96 and common law
192. See ETHics RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 135, at 6 (citing the "disconnect" between fear
and actual incidence of employer retaliation).
193. Id.
194. I am excluding for now those instances in which private law enforcement acts under the
control, or at the direct request, of the government.
195. See generally Reginald C. Govan, Workplace Privacy, 729 Prac. L. Inst./Lit. 273 (2005)
(describing federal and state limitations on workplace surveillance and searches of employee computers,
email, and telephone calls). The common way in which employers avoid the reach of state privacy
statutes and common law claims is by expressly warning employees in advance that their computers and
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tort claims such as defamation, wrongful termination, and infliction of
emotional distress.1 97 Individually and as a whole, these laws, emanating
from different states, courts, and regulators; create greater uncertainty
for the corporate investigator than the Supreme Court's singular
directives to the police.198
Corporate law enforcement is also hampered by limitations on its
jurisdiction. There are certain categories of information that corporate
investigators simply cannot obtain. They cannot subpoena the personal
phone or bank records of suspected targets; compel cooperation from ex-
employees or other persons unrelated to the company; search the homes
of suspected executives; tap their employees' personal cell phones or
landlines; or review emails sent from personal email accounts.'
99
HP's episode aptly demonstrates these limitations. After the first leak,
Carly Fiorina ordered an investigation that included interviews of HP
board members. The interviews yielded no results.20 0 The source of the
leak chose not to come forward with information. Although HP could
have taken the more intrusive step of asking each HP board member to
produce personal telephone records, it would have had little ability to
email are subject to monitoring. See, e.g., Campbell v. Woodward Photographic, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d.
857, 861 n.4 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (collecting cases).
196. For example, from 1999 through 2003, if a corporation conducted an investigation of an
employee with the assistance of an outside firm or investigator, the FTC treated the resulting
investigative material as consumer reports under the Federal Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), thereby
entitling the companies' employees to advance waming of the investigation and the opportunity to
thwart it by "destroy[ing] incriminating evidence and conspir[ing] with coworkers who might also be
involved in the fraud or theft to collaborate on their cover stories." Bruce H. Hulme, The FCRA and
Corporate Investigations, in CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS I I (Reginald J. Montgomery & William J.
Majeski eds., 2d ed. 2005).
197. See, e.g., Gibson v. Philip Morris, Inc., 685 N.E.2d 638 (I1. App. Ct. 1997) (statements in
corporate investigative memorandum sufficiently "published" for purposes of defamation claim). See
also Devin M. Ehrlich, Aurora Cassirer & Scott B. Feldman, Truth and Consequences: How to Avoid
Employee Claims of Defamation, 24 No. 8 ACC Doc. 36 (2006) (describing conflicting approaches to
employee defamation claims over statements made in intracorporate documents created during
investigations).
198. Companies who do business outside the United States face even greater uncertainty, for even
when their compliance programs follow domestic laws, they still may violate privacy and labor laws in
foreign jurisdictions. See generally Marisa Anne Pagnattaro & Ellen R. Peirce, Between a Rock and a
Hard Place. The Conflict Between U.S. Corporate Codes of Conduct and European Privacy and Work
Laws, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 375 (2007) (detailing instances in which the EU, France and
Germany rejected corporate whistleblower provisions on privacy or labor law grounds).
199. Similar observations have been made about corporate accountants: "An accountant does not
have subpoena power, nor does an accountant understand how to conduct an investigation.... Unlike
the SEC or the Justice Department, accountants cannot compel testimony or offer plea bargains to
uncover wrongdoing. Rather, accountants are limited to a few cursory tests for verifying data." Jerry W.
Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the Federal Securities Laws, 28 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 725, 798 (2003).
200. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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"demand" this information. Board members either could have refused or
handed over selective telephone record information.
If the corporation's ability to receive and demand information is
limited, can it make up lost ground by paying for information? Probably
not; the law casts the corporation simultaneously in the role of the
"person" to be deterred and as the "person" who deters others, thus its
ability to pay for information is deeply compromised.
Consider the typical corporate entity. To obtain the government's
"carrot" which is prosecutorial leniency, the corporation not only must
report all incidents of wrongdoing, but it also must identify by name the
employees who have committed such wrongdoing; provide documents
and witness statements that prove the employees' guilt; and separately
discipline the employee(s) it deems "culpable." 20 1 To be sure it receives
the government's blessing, the corporation may extend its discipline not
only to the employees who directly engaged in wrongdoing, but also to
those employees who initially failed to detect, question, or prevent such
conduct since "culpability" is itself open to interpretation. Moreover,
because the government treats more harshly those corporations that had
prior warning of wrongdoing, the productive corporate compliance
officer might extend discipline to employees who have engaged in
"questionable" but not yet illegal conduct. 20 2 In sum, insofar as the
201. "[A] corporation's cooperation may be critical in identifying potentially relevant actors and
locating relevant evidence ... and in doing so expeditiously." Filip Memorandum, supra note 8, at 7. In
a separate section, the Filip Memorandum directs prosecutors to consider if corporations have
"appropriately disciplined wrongdoers, once those employees are identified by the corporation as
culpable for the misconduct." Id. at 17.
202. Although Filip contended in a letter to Congress that a determination of whether the
corporation cooperated in the investigation would no longer be contingent on the corporation's sanction
of employees. See Filip Memorandum, supra note 8. Other portions of the Filip Memorandum have kept
intact the corporation's incentive to err on the side of employee discipline:
In determining whether or not to prosecute a corporation, the government may consider
whether the corporation has taken meaningful remedial measures. A corporation's
response to misconduct says much about its willingness to ensure that such misconduct
does not recur. Thus, corporations that fully recognize the seriousness of their misconduct
and accept responsibility for it should be taking steps to implement the personnel,
operational, and organizational changes necessary to establish an awareness among
employees that criminal conduct will not be tolerated.
Filip Memorandum, supra note 8, at 16-17. After conceding that employee discipline may be "difficult"
due to the involvement of "the human element," the Memorandum concludes:
Although corporations need to be fair to their employees, they must also be
unequivocally committed, at all levels of the corporation, to the highest standards of legal
and ethical behavior. Effective internal discipline can be a powerful deterrent against
improper behavior by a corporation's employees. Prosecutors should be satisfied that the
corporation's focus is on the integrity and credibility of its remedial and disciplinary
measures rather than on the protection of the wrongdoers.
Id. at 17.
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government declines to provide specific guidelines on how much
discipline the corporation must mete out, the rational corporate actor
will err on the side of excessive discipline because the risks of applying
too little discipline (an indictment) appear far worse than the risks of too
much discipline (loss of employee morale and employee talent).2 °3
In sum, the rational corporate entity may apply discipline harshly and
broadly because the government's carrot is premised on the
corporation's demonstration of robust discipline. The safest form of
discipline a corporation can mete out when it detects wrongdoing is to
terminate the employee. To do anything less is to risk a later conclusion
that the corporation's compliance program was ineffective.20 4 In this
manner, the government's so-called lenient treatment of corporate
entities effectively ratchets up internal corporate discipline: The more
the corporation seeks forbearance from prosecutors, the less forbearing it
will be with its own employees when it detects wrongdoing.
20 5
The above dynamic, whereby the corporation serves as both the
subject of a prosecution and as a private deputy attorney general, has
serious implications for the company's information gathering abilities.
At the very least, the current system places the corporate compliance
officer in an inherently adversarial relationship with the company's
employees. Such a relationship is not likely to encourage voluntary
reporting.
The dynamic also leaves the compliance program with little flexibility
to purchase its information from unwilling employees. Unlike its public
law enforcement counterpart, the corporate compliance program has few
carrots to offer employees in exchange for information. 20 6 Public law
enforcement agents may offer a violent member of the mob a life free of
prison if he testifies against his colleagues. Corporate law enforcement
retains no such discretion or bargaining power; the corporation cannot
credibly promise its employee anything if she tells the truth, of which
203. See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with
Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984).
204. In some limited circumstances, after the corporation has disclosed wrongdoing to the
government, the government might prefer the corporation to retain the employee while the government
conducts its own investigation.
205. Ironically, draconian sanctions may spur more serious crimes because employees have little
reason to cease wrongdoing once their conduct is sufficient to trigger their termination. The lack of
gradation in sanctions therefore eliminates marginal deterrence. Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the
Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1245 (1985)
(discussing benefits of marginal deterrence).
206. Many have discussed this issue with regard to the corporate attorney-client privilege. See,
e.g., Griffin, supra note 7, at 347 ("How does counsel conduct an honest investigation knowing that all
uncovered material will likely be ceded to the government?"). Similar information flow problems exist,
however, if the corporation is permitted to keep its privilege but required to discipline all wrongdoers.
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even the marginally savvy employee is well aware. 20 7 If cooperative and
un-cooperative employees are treated more or less the same, few
employees who are themselves mired in wrongdoing will voluntarily
cooperate with corporate investigators.
20 8
As the foregoing demonstrates, corporate-entity level sanctions do not
necessarily reduce society's enforcement costs. 20 9 Entity liability is often
favored because it can overcome problems caused by: 1) judgment proof
individuals; and 2) organizations that effectively eliminate individual
liability either by dividing responsibility among multiple actors, or by
withholding information from" the state.21 0 Accordingly, scholars have
often concluded that the "firm" is in a better position than the state to
identify and sanction misconduct:
The firm is much closer to the action, better educated about the activities
under scrutiny, and a more efficient user of enforcement resources. While
the organization does not have access to some means of sanctioning that
the state enjoys (e.g., imprisonment), the organization can impose
sanctions that the state cannot (e.g., reduced compensation and firing).
The state's sanctions may be more severe, but they are probably more
remote in how they affect the calculus of most agents contemplating
violations of law.
2 11
In small companies or companies in which conduct in question is
impossible to hide (both inside of and outside the company), Buell's
observations are correct. If the company always knows when its
employee has caused harm, and if everyone else always knows when the
company's employee has caused harm, then company-level sanctions
would be sufficient to promote deterrence.
212
The calculation is different, however, in extremely large firms where
harms remain hidden for a period of time from both the outside world
and the company's internal monitors. In these "hidden" situations,
monitors may encounter far more difficulty detecting and understanding
wrongdoing. As Buell himself observes, "Private organizations are
207. Moreover, the corporation has even fewer carrots or sticks to offer former employees.
208. Of course, innocent "bystander" employees also may come forward and report wrongdoing,
particularly with the benefit of an anonymous reporting system. To the extent these employees are
"innocent" as defined by law or by the corporation's internal code of ethics, they may lack
understanding or knowledge of the material components of an illegal scheme. The corporate investigator
therefore may find himself the repository of bits of information that hints at illicit conduct, but without
the benefit of an insider's overview.
209. Scholz, supra note 106, at 388.
210. Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1625-26
(2007) (citing Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 65, at 691, 699).
211. Id. at 1626 (footnotes omitted).
212. This indeed is the argument for entity level liability for unintentional wrongs.
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relatively opaque, the more so the larger and more sophisticated they
are. Layers of hierarchy must be penetrated to reach principal actors.
2 13
In such circumstances, state actors are not the only investigators who
will find difficulty getting to the root of the matter. Corporate
compliance officers also will require multiple sources of information
and substantial assistance from those who can help decode and explain
such information. In situations such as these, compliance efforts focused
solely on sanctions and discipline may well increase the costs of
enforcement by driving information further underground.214  As
information goes further underground, deception may offer the corporate
investigator the most plausible manner of uncovering wrongdoing.215
3. Deception and Corporate Policing
Workplace undercover investigations are not new. Used for decades by
employers in the United States and elsewhere, these complex and
sometimes lengthy operations often produce results impossible to achieve
by other means.
Like its public law enforcement counterpart, the corporate policeman
uses differing levels of deception to obtain information about its internal
corporate community.217  The corporation's access to deception,
however, is not without cost. Indeed, as HP demonstrates, the private
firm's ability to use deception in investigations is far more unclear and
therefore creates the potential for civil and criminal liability.
218
Despite the risk of subsequent liability, corporations increasingly
employ surveillance, undercover investigations, and deceptive
techniques in one-one-one interrogations. Surveillance within
corporations is hardly a new phenomenon. 219 With the advent of new
213. Buell, supra note 210, at 1625.
214. Sanchirico, supra note 182, at 1337 ("Sanctioning a given species of violation not only
discourages that violation, it also encourages those who still commit the violation to expend additional
resources avoiding detection.").
215. Undercover operations and surveillance are widely accepted techniques for investigating
clandestine terrorism conspiracies. See Dru Stevenson, Entrapment and Terrorism, 49 B.C. L. REV. 125
(2008).
216. EUGENE FERRARO, UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS IN THE WORKPLACE xiii (2000)
(describing justifications and methods for numerous types of undercover investigations).
217. Id. at 27-80 (explaining how to place undercover operative within the corporate
organization).
218. See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text (discussing state and workplace laws that
limit incursions on employee privacy).
219. See, e.g., Kevin Brass, Agencies Booming: Firms Hire Detectives to Stem Drug Abuse, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 1987, at 8 (describing rise of undercover workplace investigations to combat suspected
drug use among employees).
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technologies, private employers have steadily policed their workforce by
reviewing workers' emails; 220  tracking employees' internet use;
221
videotaping and monitoring employees visually and aurally;222 tracking
workers' whereabouts with GPS satellites or other types of
technology; 223 and requiring employees to submit to drug tests and
medical screening.
224
Apart from daily surveillance of rank-and-file employees,
corporations have also learned to adopt more sophisticated investigative
measures. A Google search of the terms "undercover corporate
investigations" and "undercover workplace investigations" generates
links to numerous private investigation companies, all of whom claim to
conduct corporate undercover investigations for both well-known and
smaller corporations. 225 Corporate security organizations, created for
and by private investigators, sponsor workshops that provide instruction
220. "Companies... keep an eye on e-mail, with 55% retaining and reviewing messages." AM.
MGMT. ASS'N & EPOLICY INST., 2005 ELECTRONIC MONITORING & SURVEILLANCE SURVEY 1 (2005),
available at http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/EMS_summary05.pdf [hereinafter 2005 ELECTRONIC
MONITORING SURVEY]. Employers may review and intercept emails maintained on the company's
server. See Govan, supra note 195, at 336 (citing Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107 (3d
Cir. 2003)). See also Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("[T]he company's
interest in preventing inappropriate and unprofessional comments or even illegal activity over its e-mail
system outweighs any privacy interest the employee may have in those comments."). See also Ray
Lewis, Employee E-Mail Privacy Still Unemployed: What the United States Can Learn from the United
Kingdom, 67 LA. L. REV. 959, 965-67 (2007).
221. "When it comes to workplace computer use, employers are primarily concerned about
inappropriate Web surfing, with 76% monitoring workers' Website connections." 2005 ELECTRONIC
MONITORING SURVEY 1, supra note 220, at 1. See, e.g., United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th
Cir. 2000) (holding that employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in files transferred from
Interet on work computer).
222. Martha Neil, New "Big Brother" Software Will Monitor Workers' Facial Expressions,
A.B.A. J. L. NEWS NOW, Jan 16, 2008, www.abajoumal.com/news/new-bigbrother_software-will-mo
nitorworkersfacialexpressions.
223. "Employers who use Assisted Global Positioning or Global Positioning Systems satellite
technology are in the minority, with only 5% using GPS to monitor cell phones; 8% using GPS to track
company vehicles; and 8% using GSP to monitor employee ID/Smartcards." 2005 ELECTRONIC
MONITORING SURVEY, supra note 220, at 2. See also Richard Mullins, Tracking Employees, KNIGHT
RIDDER TRIB. BUS. NEWS, Jan. 17, 2007, at I.
224. See AM. MGMT. ASS'N, AMA 2004 WORKPLACE TESTING SURVEY: MEDICAL TESTING I
(2004), available at http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/Medical testing 04.pdf ("Nearly 63% of U.S.
companies surveyed require medical testing of current employees or new hires."). See, e.g., Slaughter v.
John Elway Dodge SouthwestlAutoNation, 107 P.3d 1165, 1169 (Colo. App. 2005) (Dismissing suit by
individual who was fired for refusing a drug test: "[Plaintiff] has cited, and we are aware of, no federal
or Colorado case that has held that the Fourth Amendment gives rise to a public policy regarding the
[drug testing] of private individuals and entities.").
225. See, e.g., http://www.google.com/ (enter "undercover corporate investigation" in search box;
then click "Google Search") (last visited Apr. 10, 2008); http://www.google.com/ (enter "undercover
workplace investigation" in search box; then click "Google Search") (last visited Apr. 10, 2008).
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on some of the better techniques for undertaking such investigations. 226
Corporate law enforcement-including undercover investigations-has
become big business.
As corporate compliance occupies a more central role in corporate
governance, we should expect corporate law enforcement to rely on
deceptive techniques for many of the same reasons that public law
enforcement relies on these methods. First, investigators widely believe
them to be effective. Many of the crimes that pervade corporate life-
fraud, bribery, embezzlement, and other forms of theft or
misappropriation-are the types that will be carried on in secret and
difficult to detect through overt monitoring. 227 The fear that employees
will expend energy avoiding detection will spur corporate investigators
to adopt deceptive techniques to counteract perceived detection
avoidance.
Second, many of the individuals who populate corporate security
organizations have also worked in public law enforcement agencies as
prosecutors and investigators. 228 Accordingly, private law enforcers with
experience in the public law enforcement field may be particularly likely
to draw on their prior knowledge of deceptive techniques to detect
wrongdoing. This second point is particularly ironic. To prove that it is
operating more than a "paper" compliance program, the corporation
hires former law enforcement personnel to staff its compliance and
security departments. By hiring former public law enforcement
personnel, however, the corporation imports public law enforcement
values such as deception. The importation of these values, however, may
exacerbate the very problems that corporate compliance departments
were intended to solve.
C. The Costs of Deception-Fueled Enforcement
As criminologists have long noted, deception imposes costs on both
226. See, e.g., Parrent Smith Investigations, http://www.psinvestigates.com/index.htn (last visited
Jan. 22, 2008) (Offering a workshop on "How to Legally and Effectively Use Private Investigators-In
the wake of the HP and Pellicano scandals, how to determine if an investigator is using legal and ethical
means to handle your case."); American Corporate Security Investigations, Inc., http://acsii.net/ (last
visited Jan. 22, 2008) (Offering Corporate Investigation and Presentation services); Fraud Resource
Group, http://www.fraudresourcegroup.com/Business.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2008) (Offering "Fraud
Education and Employee Training" and "General Business Fraud Investigation"). See also Michael
Orey, Corporate Snoops, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 9, 2006, at 46.
227. The same arguments are often raised in the context of terrorism investigations. See
Stevenson, supra note 215, at 126.
228. Emma Schwartz, From Public to Private Employment: Companies Seek Exiting Government
Lawyers for Hire, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005 (corporations attempting to demonstrate commitment to
compliance by hiring former regulators and government attorneys).
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the deceivers and the deceived.22 9 Communities that have long been
accustomed to government-fueled deception may learn to distrust both
the government and each other. 230 As a result, citizens who witness
wrongdoing may feel less impetus to interfere with wrongdoers or
provide information to the government. As mutual trust decreases, so too
may social cohesion. 231  Social norms that previously restrained
misconduct may fall apart.
In the public enforcement realm, many of these issues have been
discussed with regard to criminal law enforcement in poor urban
areas. 232 Observers have yet to consider, however, the ramifications of
legally encouraged deception in the corporate arena. A few of the most
obvious concerns include abuse of power, the erosion of informal norm-
based mechanisms of control, and reduced risk-taking and
entrepreneurialism.
1. Abuse of Power
As observers of the public realm have long known, undercover
investigations bear great potential for abuse and lawbreaking by the very
people who are charged with protecting the community. 233 Enforcers
may become so used to lying to criminal targets that they also deceive
innocents. 234 Alternately, enforcers may spend so much time with their
229. See GARY T. MARX, POLICE SURVEILLANCE (1988); George I. Miller, Observations on
Police Undercover Work, 25 CRIMINOLOGY 27 (1987).
230. Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN.
L. REV. 645, 652 (2004).
231. The mutual distrust between African Americans and law enforcement officers makes it
less likely that African Americans will report crimes to the police, assist the police in
criminal investigations, and participate in community policing programs that lead to greater
social control of neighborhoods .... Neighborly distrust leads to greater atomization of
African Americans in poor communities, which leads, in turn, to a breakdown in social
cohesion in the places where the need for social cohesion is the greatest. Individuals who
keep to themselves reduce opportunities for enforcement of law-abiding norms in the
community.
Tracy L. Meares, It's a Question of Connections, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 579, 590-91 (1997) (citation
omitted) (criticizing police departments' approach to teenage violence and drug use).
232. See generally Natapoff, supra note 230.
233. Jacqueline E. Ross, Tradeoffs in Undercover Investigations: A Comparative Perspective, 69
U. CHI. L. REV. 1501, 1527 (2002) (undercover investigations create "risks of misuse and political
targeting"), reviewing UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Cyrille
Fijnaut & Gary T. Marx eds., 1995). "State-sponsored deception... raises all the ethical issues
generally associated with deception." Gary T. Marx, Under-the-Covers Undercover Investigations:
Some Reflections on the State's Use of Sex and Deception in Law Enforcement, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS
13, 13 (1992).
234. "When police are permitted to lie in the interrogation context, why should they refrain from
lying to judges when applying for warrants, from violating internal police organization rules against
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targets that they come to identify with them.235 Close supervision of
informants and undercover agents is therefore necessary to prevent
externalities such as the fabrication or destruction of evidence. Internal
agency oversight 236 and judicial doctrines such as entrapment 237 curb,
but do not eliminate, the specter of public law-enforcement abuse.
As the HP episode demonstrates, the possibility of abuse is just as
prevalent in the corporate context, wherein enforcers must navigate the
line between permissible deception and outright illegal conduct. This is
particularly risky in the corporate world because there currently are no
universally enforceable standards for corporate internal investigations
and few mechanisms in place to monitor corporate investigations other
than ad hoc arrangements between corporations and their outside and
internal counsels. Indeed, many of the state professional responsibility
codes discourage in-house counsel's supervision of covert investigations
because lawyers are barred from engaging in deceptive conduct, either
directly or indirectly through agents.238
In sum, to the extent lawmakers and scholars intend corporations to
lying, or from lying in the courtroom?" Jerome H. Skolnick & Richard A. Leo, The Ethics of Deceptive
Interrogation, 11 CRIM JUST. ETHICS 3, 9 (1992).
235. Hay, supra note 15, at 397 (explaining the relationship between undercover agents and
targets, "[I]n which the police befriend and employ people who belong behind bars, invites corruption
and blackmail, depletes the symbolic value of the law, and sullies the courts who are asked to put their
stamp of approval on it" (footnotes omitted)).
236. For a discussion of internal guidelines, see Smykla & Hamilton , supra note 173 (following
survey of 100 largest police departments, authors conclude that departmental guidelines tend to stress
"procedures" for conducting investigations at the expense of discussing "when" such investigations are
appropriate).
237. "[T]he law.., gives insufficient incentive to government agents to limit undercover
encouragement of crime; the entrapment defense improves matters by removing the law enforcement
gain from overzealous or wasteful sting operations." Richard H. McAdams, The Political Economy of
Entrapment, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 107, 165 (2005).
238. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2002) (professional misconduct for
an attorney to engage in "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation"); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (attorney may not violate Professional Rules through another person); MODEL CODE
OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4) (1980) (a lawyer "shall not" engage in conduct involving
"dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation"); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-
102(A)(2) (lawyer may not violate rules through "actions of another"). For a discussion of how different
jurisdictions have inconsistently applied these rules to private attorneys who supervise covert
investigations, see Douglas R. Richmond, Deceptive Lawyering, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 577, 583-98 (2005)
("lines cannot be confidently drawn in this area; at best, lawyers must evaluate associated risks on a
continuum"). By contrast, the law has given prosecutors more leeway in supervising government-
initiated covert investigations, although they must avoid contacting represented parties and may not
misrepresent their identities "when acting in representational roles." Id. at 593. See also Fred C.
Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207, 232 (2000)
("[C]ountless reported decisions acknowledge the occurrence of surreptitious recording in criminal
investigations without questioning its propriety. No disciplinary body has ever sanctioned prosecutors
for authorizing undercover officers and informants to gather evidence in this manner." (footnotes
omitted)).
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increase their policing functions, the same lawmakers and scholars must
consider, at the very least: the abuses of power that traditionally inhere
with the police power, the extent to which those abuses may apply in the
corporate context, and the institutional safeguards necessary to curb and
eliminate such abuses.
2. Signaling, Reciprocity, and "Informal Social Control
239
Typically, once the investigator is placed and has begun his cover
position, some period of time is required for him to build relationships of
trust and acceptance with supervisors. During this relationship-building
phase, the investigator.., establishes himself as a hardworking,
dedicated employee who listens to instructions and completes his
assignments. This element is critical, for after the relationship-building
phase the investigator wants the opportunity to freely wander and
associate without attracting unnecessary attention from supervisors.
The successful undercover investigation will also recruit a sponsor. A
sponsor is a carefully selected coworker that the investigator can use to
create the appearance of having coworker friends that seem to trust her
and without hesitation will vouch for her. Without attracting undue
attention then, the skilled investiator transitions from relationship
building to proactive investigation.
Many readers will find themselves disturbed by the preceding
description of a typical private undercover investigation. There is
something quite odd about the sincerity with which the author advises
the investigator to obtain the "trust" of his fellow employees when of
course, he harbors no such trust in his colleagues and certainly does not
merit such trust.241 Corporate investigators defend such acts as necessary
for the overall social welfare of the company and it shareholders.
"American corporations have the moral responsibility to keep a clean
house ... Consistent with that responsibility, employers of all sizes have
the obligation to investigate all matters involving employee malfeasance
and criminal activity in their workplace. To do otherwise is negligent
and immoral. '242 Nevertheless, to borrow Eric Posner's language about
239. See Neil Gunningham, Private Ordering, Self-Regulation and Futures Markets: A
Comparative Study of Informal Social Control, 13 LAW & POL'Y 297, 297-98 (1991) (describing
"potentially crucial role that informal mechanisms of social control... can play in constraining
deviance" among futures traders).
240. FERRARO, supra note 216, at 28, 30.
241. Law enforcers have expressed similar notions in the context of criminal investigations. See
Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir. 1994) ("What you try to do is establish a bond of
trust between you and the offender.").
242. FERRARO, supra note 216, at 23 (emphasis added).
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law and social norms, an employee who became aware of a corporate
mole within her midst would have to maintain an awfully low "discount
rate" to conclude that such deception truly was in her overall best
interests.243
Whatever one's take on the value of social norms in corporate law, it
is not much of a stretch to conclude that aggressive corporate policing
that includes deception may reduce employee morale and thereby
interfere with the company's good faith attempts at improving and
maintaining a cohesive and ethical corporate culture. If trust, loyalty,
and procedural justice are building blocks of a compliant culture,
deceptive enforcement techniques appear antithetical to the entity's
compliance efforts. Deceptive enforcement techniques may undermine
the entity's legitimacy by causing employees to feel that they have been
treated unfairly. 244 As such, they run the risk of altering or impairing
"existing public and private networks and structures and formal and
informal mechanisms of social control.,
245
Deceptive enforcement techniques also entrench corporate hierarchy
by investing power and information in those who are authorized to
deceive, and stripping privacy, dignity, and information from those who
are the subject of deception. These techniques create, at best, a specious
form of transparency. Employees are monitored and even know this
generally, but they have no idea who is watching them, or how and
when they will be watched.
Having stripped its employees of trust, the company's policing
program may cause employees to conclude that they have been played
as "suckers." To the extent one believes in "reciprocity theory" as
articulated by Professor Dan Kahan, deception is one of the least
effective law enforcement techniques the corporation could employ.
246
Reciprocity theory (which Kahan and others have supported by
reference to experimental psychology) rejects the notion that criminal
wrongdoing is influenced by individuals' cost-benefit analysis. Instead,
Kahan theorizes that most members of the community are primed to
contribute to the collective good, even at their personal expense,
243. Posner has argued that social norms are reflections of an individual's discount rate. See supra
Part II.A.2.
244. "[1]f an individual perceives a rule to be unnecessarily restrictive or perceives that she has
been treated unfairly in an enforcement proceeding, the norms of autonomy or fair process may
counteract the effects of the norm of law compliance." Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A
Testable Typology of Social Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55,
82 (2003).
245. Gunningham, supra note 239, at 300.
246. See generally Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, supra note
113.
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provided they believe that others are also contributing to the collective
good: "Moral and emotional reciprocators take pride in contributing
their fair share to public goods, but deeply resent being taken advantage
of." 24 7 As illustrated by HP, corporate policing has the potential to
trigger employees' sense that someone is taking advantage of them.
This is not to say that all enforcement efforts are doomed from the
start. Some levels of surveillance may be accepted as necessary or
legitimate. Audits, drug screening, and even monitoring for
inappropriate computer use might be accepted among a company's
employees as a normal and necessary component of everyday work life.
The lesson from HP, however, is that the more deceptive and uncommon
the practice, the more likely it is to trigger negative feelings.
If deception encourages otherwise compliant employees to conclude
that the corporation is treating them as suckers, it may also signal a
different group of employees-the so-called Holmesian bad men who
have no interest in the collective good in the first place-that the
company's overt monitoring abilities are relatively weak. Surveillance
and undercover investigations are fairly expensive and create numerous
risks. Presumably, the company would not resort to them if overt
monitoring mechanisms (periodic reports and certifications, regularly
scheduled audits) were adequate. A company that must resort to
deceptive practices must lack either the informal controls or the direct
monitoring capacity to ensure that its employees and officers are
following the law.
Here again, the fall-out from HP's conduct is instructive. On one
hand, once the company's pretexting investigation was disclosed, the
perceived immorality of its investigation all but eclipsed the
questionable conduct of leaking information to the press without
authorization. On the other hand, the investigation demonstrated to
current and future leakers the inherent limitations of a private company's
corporate security program. For the cynic, HP's lesson is that
prospective leakers, if they speak to journalists over the telephone,
should use cell phones registered in someone else's name.
To the extent this discussion appears overly pessimistic, it is
worthwhile to consider the atmosphere of heavily policed crime areas
where undercover investigations and police deception are the norm. In
cities such as these, cultural norms have arisen that discourage
cooperation with the police. 248 Although many explanations abound for
247. Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner's Law and Social
Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REv. 367, 379 (2002).
248. See Christopher Heredia, T-Shirts Illustrate Divide: 'Stop Snitchin' Stymies Police Trying to
Cut Crime, SAN. FRAN. CHRON., Jan. 28, 2006, at B8; David Kocieniewski, Scared Silent: So Many
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citizens' refusal to cooperate with the police, at least some of the fault
might be due to the deceptive techniques that police have been known to
use when they interact with witnesses and targets of investigations. In
general, people do not like to assist institutions they dislike anddistrust. 249
3. Collective Action and Risk-Taking
One of the benefits of publicized deception (i.e., an atmosphere in
which employees know that informants and other forms of surveillance
are possible, if not likely) is that it destabilizes conspiracies, which are
more dangerous than individual criminal conduct.250 People are less
likely to work with one another if they distrust each other. Thus, it is not
surprising that Professor Neal Kumar Katyal expressly argued for law
enforcers to adopt destabilizing tactics in his seminal discussion on
conspiracy:
[C]onspiracy law should encourage the use of excessive monitoring, chill
discussion within the [criminal] firm, lead it to compartmentalize
information, strive to create team-production problems, impose vicarious
liability to make illegal firms more inefficient, make it difficult for the
parties to use default rules and off-the-rack principles to reduce
transaction costs, refuse to extend legal enforcement to intra-firm
disputes, and water down their intellectual property.
251
When a world is populated primarily by criminal groups, who engage
solely in deviant behavior and live apart from innocents, the resulting
inefficiencies wrought by Katyal's prescriptions are positive outcomes.
Society benefits when criminal groups weaken and crack under pressure.
Accordingly, the specter of undercover surveillance and investigations
isolates and atomizes criminals by making them more distrustful of each
other.2 52 Criminals who devote more time to looking over their shoulder
Crimes, and Reasons not to Cooperate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2007, at 121; Meares, supra note 231, at
590 ("The mutual distrust between African Americans and law enforcement officers makes it less likely
that African Americans will report crimes to the police.").
249. "Citizens are more disposed to cooperate with police when institutions enjoy a high level of
legitimacy. The perceived legitimacy of an institution, it has been shown, depends largely on whether
citizens perceive that they are receiving fair and respectful treatment by police and other decision
makers." Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, supra note 113, at 1525.
250. "When the labor in criminality is divided, criminality is likely to be more effective and to
cause greater harm. A crime in an organization therefore may present a greater threat to society than a
similar crime committed by an individual outside the organizational setting." Buell, supra note 210, at
1624. See also Katyal, supra note 168 (conspiracy provides both economic and psychological benefits to
members of the group, thereby increasing risks of harm to community).
251. Katyal, supra note 168, at 1397.
252. Cf Dru Stevenson, Entrapment and the Problem of Deterring Police Misconduct, 37 CONN
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therefore are forced necessarily to reduce the quantity and quality of
their wrongdoing.253
The same result does not hold, however, if the criminals co-exist with
non-criminals, and if the criminals and non-criminals engage in socially
beneficial conduct alongside deviant conduct. This, unfortunately, is
exactly the case for most corporations.
Corporations are not fronts for purely illegal activity, but rather
mostly law-abiding organizations that include some potential and actual
wrongdoers who simultaneously perform socially beneficial tasks. Law
enforcement techniques grounded in deception alienate not only the
criminals in the organization, but everyone else as well. Accordingly,
completely legal corporate projects based on group trust may be
undermined by feelings of distrust and resentment that well-publicized,
or even semi-well publicized, deception creates.
254
In a related vein, deception might also undermine legitimate risk-
taking behavior within firms. Risk-taking is often considered beneficial
in corporations. Indeed, it is the raison d'Otre for Delaware's business
judgment rule.255 Deception-fueled enforcement, however, reintroduces
risk back into the workplace by raising the likelihood that mistakes will
be repackaged and questioned as incidents of wrongdoing 256-- perhaps
this is no accident. Donald Langevoort has suggested that one of the
goals of Sarbanes-Oxley may have been to reduce risk-taking among
L. REv. 67, 84-85 (2004) (explaining rise of group-oriented crime and consequent need for undercover
police operations to counteract power of criminal groups).
253. "Would-be culprits are less likely to break the law when they know that an apparently
genuine criminal opportunity may be a police trap. Potential confederates become less trustworthy."
Hay, supra note 15, at 394.
254. This is not to say that all group conduct is wonderful. Overly cohesive groups may suffer
frori "groupthink" and other pathologies. See James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director:
Countering Corporate Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435, 446 (2004) (observing that "a cohesive
group" can convince itself that its actions are "disinterested even if in reality they are designed to
perpetuate the group and enrich its members"); Katyal, supra note 168, at 1315-25 (cataloging dangers
of group identity).
255. The law protects shareholder investment interests against the uneconomic consequences
that the presence of such second-guessing risk would have on director action and shareholder
wealth in a number of ways. It authorizes corporations to pay for director and officer liability
insurance and authorizes corporate indemnification in a broad range of cases, for example.
But the first protection against a threat of sub-optimal risk acceptance is the so-called
business judgment rule.
Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).
256. Langevoort, supra note 13, at 309 ("Accountability has its downside: the familiar problems
of risk aversion and frustration that stem from the fear that one will be incorrectly second-guessed.").
See also Renier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE
L.J. 857, 884 n.78 (1984) (citing overdeterrence costs when managers forego legally risky but beneficial
activity due to fear of increased penalties).
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corporate executives 257 -self-policing certainly is one way of doing so.
4. Concluding Thoughts on Deception's Costs in the Corporate
Workplace
Some may argue that many of the costs of corporate policing, and
corporate-sponsored deception in particular, have been well known for
quite some time. But an interesting characteristic of lower-level
workplace surveillance was that it was limited largely to specific
workplace vices (drug use; Internet pornography; and in some instances,
lack of productivity), and had little to do with the board of directors. For
"crimes" such as these, the undercover workplace monitoring operations
were limited mostly to mail rooms, lunch rooms, and areas of the
company that lower-level employees frequented.258
The monitoring of financial reporting and other high-level business
functions, on the other hand, was historically left to lawyers, auditors,
and other professional gatekeepers who were not likely to employ the
deceptive techniques that public and private law enforcement officials
regularly employ. The legislative response to Enron and similar scandals
dramatically altered the scope and importance of the company's
compliance apparatus.259 Policing is no longer the concern of some mid-
level corporate security executive, but rather the responsibility of the
board. Moreover, whereas monitoring was previously driven either by
regulatory or economic considerations (eliminating employee waste, for
example), board-level monitoring and surveillance are now driven by the
positive obligations put in place by Sarbanes-Oxley and by the
extremely high-stakes risks associated with entity-level corporate
prosecution. As a result, the company must "catch" its own employee-
crooks before prosecutors or shareholders get to them first.
Accordingly, monitoring and surveillance have not merely migrated
upward within the corporate food chain, but by necessity, have become
more complex and, as HP reveals, more deceptive. With complexity and
deception, ironically, comes the very result that the post-Enron response
sought to prevent: the breaking of laws. It is hardly news that law
enforcers sometimes break laws in the course of their jobs. The
257. Langevoort, supra note 93, at 1832.
258. See FERRARO, supra note 216, at 1-16 (describing use of undercover investigations to
eliminate drug and alcohol use in workplace settings).
259. See Wray & Hur, supra note 143. Prior to the federal government's response to Enron and
related scandals, the Delaware Chancery Court had already signaled the importance of corporate
compliance in In Re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director's Compliance Oversight Responsibility in the Post Caremark
Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2001).
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prevalence of internal affairs units in large police departments across the
country aptly demonstrates the maxim that those who enforce laws are
not immune from the urge to break them. However steeped in common-
sense this problem may appear, it is one that has been largely ignored by
the proponents of corporate compliance.
III. CORPORATE POLICING, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND THE BOARD
Our current legal regime has created a climate in which two disparate
and competing value systems are likely to conflict. On one hand, we
have encouraged corporations, who are also private employers, to adopt
a police ethic that inevitably includes deception and secrecy. Deceptive
policing, in turn, can create distrust, disloyalty, and unpredictability
within the firm. At the same time, however, we have advised these same
companies that they must adopt internal governance techniques that
emphasize transparency and promote a sense of trust and well-being
among their various stakeholders, and particularly in their employees.
We have assumed that these goals are consistent and mutually
supportive. An example of this presumed consistency appears in the
ABA Compliance Committee Corporate Compliance Survey in 2005,
which opined:
No compliance program, no matter how well designed and funded, can
operate successfully in a corporate culture poisoned by cynicism and
distrust. Employees will discount all statements regarding ethics and
values as mere words, more evidence of corporate hypocrisy.
The ABA Compliance Committee continues, "[T]he company should
sincerely articulate core values that employees believe define the
organization's culture. Then, legal compliance and ethics will be woven
into the corporate fabric, and not awkwardly affixed in case the
government comes knocking. ' '261 The ABA's statement reflects the
common presumption that corporate culture improves corporate
compliance. But the ABA seems to have missed the opposite question:
Does corporate compliance improve corporate culture?
The repository of this conflict is the corporation's board of directors;
although the board will likely delegate both the governance and policing
functions to lawyers and outside consultants, its members nevertheless
retain the ultimate responsibility for overseeing the corporation's
internal policing apparatus. For lower-level employee investigations, the
tension between policing and cultural governance remains safely out of
260. Corporate Compliance Survey, supra note 6, at 1787.
261. Id.
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sight and out of mind. When, however, the allegation of misconduct
reaches upward into the board itself (as was the case with HP), the
conflict between policing and governance becomes a recipe for
dysfunction.
Board members lack the expertise to directly monitor the private law
enforcers who are conducting investigations-particularly investigations
that reach up into the highest levels of the company. The company's
internal counsel will therefore be relied upon to both monitor and design
the corporation's police function. Corporate counsel, however, may
either be too aligned with the company's investigators (as was the case
with Kevin Hunsaker) or too out of the loop (as appeared to be the
situation with Ann Baskins) to provide adequate guidance or oversight.
Even when the company turns to external counsel for help (as HP did
with Wilson Sonsini) it may do so too late in the process to resolve the
conflict of enforcement and governance norms. Moreover, all of these
consultants will generate costs to the company over time, with
questionable results.
262
The primary aim of this Article has been to expose a conflict that has
not been discussed in either the corporate or criminal law literature. I
dedicate the rest of this section to suggesting further research for better
understanding and perhaps reducing this budding conflict.
A. Researching the Effect of Corporate Policing on Corporate
Governance and Culture
The above analysis demonstrates the need for research on the narrow
topic of how corporate policing affects efforts at implementing and
maintaining a healthy corporate culture. As part of this effort,
researchers should attempt to better understand corporate policing and to
quantify factors that relate to both corporate policing and corporate
culture, such as:
• The extent of "in-house" policing within large and small
companies, including publicly held and private firms;
* the investigatory tactics, including surveillance and undercover
investigations, used to obtain information;
* the quantity and quality of sanctions meted out by the
corporation in response to in-house corporate investigations of
262. Part of HP's settlement with the California Attorney General required it to obtain the
assistance of Bart Schwartz, a well-known former prosecutor, in redesigning its compliance and ethics
program. See News Release, Hewlett-Packard Co., HP Reaches Resolution with California Attorney
General of Claims Arising from Board Leak Investigation (Dec. 7, 2006), http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/ne
wsroom/press/2006/061207a.html.
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wrongdoing;
* the manner in which sanctions are communicated to the
company's employees;
* the board's understanding of the company's policing apparatus,
including the nature and quantity of investigations and the
manner by which employees are sanctioned; and
* the employees' knowledge of the company's policing apparatus,
including its tactics, and the quality and quantity of its
discipline.
Additionally, employees should be surveyed regarding their feelings of
loyalty toward the organization; their perception of management's
commitment to building an ethical culture; their willingness to engage in
or report misconduct, or both; and their willingness to seek advice for
resolving difficult ethical issues.
The attempt to measure compliance and ethical behavior in
corporations is not a new phenomenon. Several organizations have
published widely-reported surveys that have concluded that ethical
misconduct remains an intractable problem for American businesses.
263
Although some of the persistence in misconduct may be the fault of
"cosmetic" or sham programs, 264 the intractability of the problem
suggests something more. Researchers should therefore consider the
interplay between corporate policing and the corporate compliance
industry's improvement-or lack thereof-of corporate culture.
B. Recognizing the Gap in Corporate Law Enforcement
The foregoing discussion also suggests that both scholars and
policymakers should re-evaluate the presumption that corporate entities
are always better situated than government enforcers to identify and
deter employees from wrongdoing. As HP demonstrates, numerous
physical and jurisdictional limits constrain corporate policing. Many of
us would conclude that this is a good thing. Police power is not
something we countenance easily in any setting, and we should think
hard before we extend it to potentially thousands of private investigators
within corporate firms.
Moreover, the incentives for corporate investigators are different from
their public law enforcement counterparts. Government prosecutors and
agents are presumed to be devoid of bias in part because they make the
263. See, e.g., ETHIcs RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 135, at 1 ("More than five years after Enron
and other corporate ethics debacles, businesses of all size, type, and ownership show little-if any-
meaningful reduction in their enterprise-wide risk of unethical behavior.").
264. Krawiec, supra note 11 (criticizing compliance programs that are cosmetic and erected as a
means of evading legal requirements).
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same salary regardless of whom they convict. 265 Government agents are,
at the very least, subject to judicial oversight and a set of internal rules
and regulations that have arisen over the years to combat abuse and
incompetence. No similar set of uniform standards or oversight has been
put in place for corporate law enforcement.
Accordingly, our law of corporate policing is at a crossroads. Either
we will enact laws and regulations that increase the corporate
investigator's power, or we will accept the gap between the corporate
and public policeman's powers. Accepting the policing gap between
corporate and public law enforcement as a given necessarily means that
we must also accept limitations on the corporate compliance function, at
least so far as deterrence is concerned. Where corporate officers and
employees are intent on hiding wrongdoing from internal monitors and
gatekeepers, the tools available to corporate law enforcement simply
may not be enough to apprehend or prevent the criminal act. In some
instances, the corporation may not always be the entity best situated to
police its employees.
IV. CONCLUSION
The HP pretexting crisis did not last very long and its perpetrators are
no longer connected to the company. One might say that the company
has learned its lesson. Yet, the underlying tension between corporate
compliance and cultural corporate governance remains firmly intact. It
may well be that this tension is unavoidable. Regardless of how many
individuals demonstrate ethical values consistent with reciprocity theory,
a significant minority may be better moved by cost-benefit analysis and,
accordingly, those policies that best heighten the costs of misconduct.
For that reason, we should expect effective corporate compliance
programs to incorporate aspects of both the "values-based" and
"deterrence-based" approaches to compliance.
266
As corporate entities continue their search for the "Goldilocks" of
compliance regimes, we do them a great disservice if we ignore the
underlying tension between those values that are touted as the bedrock
of a sound corporate culture (trust, fairness, honesty), and those tools
that are deemed essential for the discovery and discipline of wrongdoing
(deception). So long as we continue to ignore this tension, we should not
be surprised by scandals such as HP's pretexting episode. However
extreme an example it might have been, it is neither the only, nor final,
265. This of course is a simplification; apart from money, prosecutors and agents receive different
forms of compensation for their zeal, such as promotions and increased political power.
266. Regan, supra note 88, at 971.
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instance of conflict between corporate policing and corporate
governance.
z
